Factors contributing to the effectiveness of audit committees at selected Namibian state owned enterprises by Amoomo, Natanael
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIT COMMITTEES AT 
SELECTED NAMIBIAN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
NATANAEL AMOOMO 
 
 
 
 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN ACCOUNTING SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
at the 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF EM ODENDAAL 
 
 
COSUPERVISOR: PROF B ACKERS 
 
 
 
 
NOVEMBER 2018 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I declare that FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEES AT SELECTED NAMIBIAN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES is my own 
work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and 
acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
I further declare that I submitted the dissertation to originality checking software and that 
it falls within the accepted requirements for originality. 
 
I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for 
examination at Unisa for another qualification or at any other education institution. 
 
 
 
    23/01/2019 
.............................................................   ....................................... 
SIGNATURE       DATE 
Natanael Amoomo 
Student number: 34722068 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Audit committees (ACs) can enhance corporate governance in the public sector, 
particularly in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This study adopted a qualitative 
research approach to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected 
Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The empirical data was 
collected primarily through semi-structured interviews with participants as well as from 
field notes and company documents. The study highlighted certain AC characteristics 
and practices contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to 
provide sound corporate governance. The mandate, composition, managing the 
activities of the AC, performance assessment of the members of the AC and reporting 
of the AC if applied correctly can enhance effectiveness of ACs. The study also 
highlighted weaknesses, suggesting that some of the ACs needed improvement in order 
to enhance corporate governance at SOEs.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Ouditkomitees kan korporatiewe toesig in die openbare sektor verbeter – veral in 
staatsondernemings. In hierdie studie is ŉ kwalitatiewe navorsingsbenadering gevolg 
om faktore te identifiseer wat bydra tot die doeltreffendheid van ouditkomitees in 
uitgesoekte Namibiese staatsondernemings om behoorlike korporatiewe toesig te 
voorsien. Die empiriese data is hoofsaaklik deur middel van halfgestruktureerde 
onderhoude met deelnemers ingesamel, en ook van veldnotas en 
maatskappydokumente verkry. Die studie het bepaalde kenmerke en praktyke van 
ouditkomitees uitgewys wat bydra tot die doeltreffendheid van ouditkomitees in 
uitgesoekte Namibiese staatsondernemings om behoorlike korporatiewe toesig te 
voorsien. Die mandaat, samestelling, beheer oor aktiwiteite van die ouditkomitee, 
prestasiebeoordeling van die lede van die ouditkomitee, en verslagdoening van die 
ouditkomitee, kan die doeltreffendheid van ouditkomitees verbeter mits dit reg toegepas 
word. Die studie het ook op swakpunte gewys, met die voorstel dat sommige van die 
ouditkomitees verbeter moet word sodat dit korporatiewe toesig in staatsondernemings 
kan verbeter.   
 
Sleutelterme 
Ouditkomitee; korporatiewetoesigpraktyke; doeltreffendheid; onafhanklikheid; 
kwalitatiewe navorsing; staatsondernemings  
  
KAFUSHANE NGOCWANINGO 
 
Amakomidi ocwaningomabhuku (ACs) angakuphucula futhi akwenze ngcono 
ukuphathwa kwezikhungo zikahulumeni, ikakhulukazi amaBhizinisi Kahulumeni (SOEs). 
Lolu cwaningo lwasebenzisa indlela egxile ocwaningweni olukhwalithethivu ukuhlonza 
izinto/izimo ezifaka isandla ekusebenzeni kahle nangobunyoninco kwamakomidi 
ocwaningomabhuku emabhizinisini kahulumeni wase-Namibia ngenhloso 
yokuqinisekisa ukuphatha okuphusile kulezo zikhungo. Idatha egxile kulokho 
okubonakalayo nokuphathekayo (empirical data) yaqoqwa ikakhulukazi 
ngokusebenzisa ama-semi-structured interviews abanjwa nababambiqhaza bocwaningo 
futhi yaqoqwa nasemanothini alokho okwabonwa futhi kwatholwa ngabacwaningi 
ngenkathi bevakashele izindawo okwabanjelwa kuzona ucwaningo kanye 
nasemibhalweni yezikhungo okwenziwa kuzona ucwaningo. Ucwaningo lwaveza 
ngokucacile izici-bunjalo zama-AC ezithile kanye nezinqubonkambiso ezifaka isandla 
ekusebenzeni kahle kwama-AC kuma-SOE ase-Namibia akhethiweyo ngenhloso 
yokuqinisekisa ukuphatha okuphusile kulezo zikhungo. Igunya, isimo sokwakheka, 
ukuphathwa kwemisebenzi ye-AC, ukuhlolwa komsebenzi owenziwa ngamalungu e-AC, 
kanye nokubika kwe-AC, uma kwenziwa ngendlela efanele, kungakuphucula 
ukusebenza kwama-AC ngokuthi kuwenze asebenze kahle futhi ngobunyoninco. 
Ucwaningo lwabonisa nobuthakathaka obukhona, futhi lwaphakamisa ukuthi ama-AC 
athile adinga ukuthuthukiswa ukuze akwazi ukuphucula nokwenza ngcono ukuphathwa 
kwama-SOE. 
 
Amatemu asemqoka 
Ikomidi locwaningomabhuku; izinqubonkambiso zokuphathwa kahle kwesikhungo; 
ukusebenza kahle nangobunyoninco; ukuzimela, ucwaningo olukhwalithethivu; 
amaBhizinisi Kahulumeni 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Good corporate governance practices define the health and credibility of any business 
entity today (IoDSA, 2009). However, over the last two decades, the world has 
observed how some entities have stumbled; some were shaken; while the existence of 
the less fortunate ones came to an abrupt end because of poor governance (Akeju & 
Babatunde, 2017). Against this backdrop, governance codes and legislation were 
introduced to help build the credibility of entities and where necessary, restore public 
confidence in these organisations (IoDSA, 2009). The Cadbury Report was issued in 
the United Kingdom (UK) in 1992, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-
204 (SOX Act) was enacted in the United States (US) and in South Africa, a series of 
King Reports on governance and the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 were released 
(IoDSA, 2009). In Namibia, the Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX), jointly with the 
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA), released the NamCode − the corporate 
governance code for Namibia (NSX, 2014). The main reason for having these codes 
and legislation is explained by the Bangladesh Code of Corporate Governance 
(Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 2004), which is to improve the overall quality of 
corporate governance practices. These governance codes and legislation have given 
considerable attention to the role of the audit committee (AC), an important element of 
good corporate governance (Kusnadi, Leong, Suwardy & Wang, 2015). When strong 
and effective, an AC can be vital in, among other things, ensuring the integrity of 
integrated reporting and internal financial controls as well as identifying and managing 
financial risks (IoDSA, 2009). Within the context of this study, the terms ‘”corporate 
governance” and “governance” and “organisation and company” are used 
interchangeably. 
 
According to the NamCode (NSX, 2014:2.23), the board of directors should delegate 
certain functions to well-structured committees without, however, abdicating its own 
responsibilities. The NamCode (NSX, 2014:2.23:23.1) goes further to say that board 
committees constitute an important element of the governance process and should be 
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established with clearly agreed reporting procedures and a written scope of authority. 
The AC is a committee of selected members of the board, whose responsibilities 
include overseeing the financial reporting process, the integrity of financial reports and 
the effectiveness of internal controls (Golalipour, 2016; Kusnadi et al., 2015; 
Loebbecke, 1999:101). This type of arrangement applies more to the private sector and 
to certain sections of the public sector with similar operations to the private sector such 
as State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Shulman & Kim, 2011; Magrane & Malthus, 2010). 
The AC concept originated in the US as far back as 1940. Following the fraud 
perpetrated by McKesson and Robbins during the 20th century where fraudulent sales 
documentation were generated, the US Stock Exchange Organisation proposed that all 
listed companies select independent auditors by a special committee of non-executive 
members of the board.  Although the term ‘AC’ was not mentioned as such, several 
companies established ACs as a result of the McKesson and Robbins scandal (Braiotta, 
Gazzaway, Colson & Ramamoorti, 2010:437-469). This proposal was later approved 
and regulated in 1971 by the US Stock Exchange Organisation (Braiotta et al., 2010). 
Since then, ACs became widely accepted as an integral part of good governance, 
charged mainly with oversight of financial reporting and internal control. As ACs 
evolved, more oversight responsibilities were added, such as risk management, internal 
auditing, external auditing, compliance and ethics (Braiotta et al., 2010; Vanasco, 1994). 
 
In the public sector, and more specifically in SOEs, an AC can help government 
establish accountability for the services it provides to taxpayers, citizens and residents. 
The role of the AC can thus result in benefits such as improved financial reporting and 
practices, appropriate action against fraud and enhanced internal and external audit 
functions (Elwood & Lacalle, 2016; AICPA, 2010). In SOEs, an effective AC can 
increase the integrity and efficiency of the audit process as well as the system of 
internal control and financial reporting (Akeju & Babatunde, 2017; Nashwa, 2005). 
Effectiveness can be defined as the extent to which the desired outcome is successfully 
attained (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). Effectiveness also implies having the necessary 
capabilities to achieve the desired results (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). However, within 
the context of this study, effectiveness means working as intended.  
 
In Namibia, news reports have highlighted the dismal performance of SOEs, therefore, 
the release of the NamCode, as a voluntary code, was a step in the right direction to 
promote good corporate governance by addressing the issue of ACs within the 
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Namibian context (IPPR, 2011). This is as opposed to the King II report which was 
previously adopted by Namibia (NSX, 2014). The release of the NamCode was also in 
line with the suggestion by Boamah (2003) for the development of reporting and 
enforcement requirements as well as good practices in corporate governance. Before 
the introduction of the NamCode, Namibia’s SOEs operated under the State-Owned 
Enterprise Governance Act, No. 2 of 2006 (SOE Governance Act). However, this Act is 
silent on ACs. In comparison, in South Africa, the Public Finance Management Act, No. 
1 of 1999 (PFMA) specifically includes a section on ACs (South Africa, 1999).  
 
The study of Hansye (2012) on the AC as a gatekeeper for effective corporate 
governance indicates that benefits accrue from the use of ACs. These benefits will be 
explored in this study in the context of Namibia to advocate for strong, governance-
driven ACs in SOEs. The role of ACs in corporate governance has been widely 
explored. However, in the Namibian context, there is scant research on the specific 
characteristics of ACs and their influence on governance, and by extension, on public 
service delivery (Ellwood & Lacalle, 2015). A study conducted by Ashipala (2012) 
examined corporate governance within the framework of the SOE Governance Act in 
Namibia, however, this work largely ignored the role of ACs in corporate governance. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
For many years, news reports in Namibia have highlighted the dismal performance of 
SOEs. These entities have been characterised by shoddy and unreliable service, lack of 
accountability and transparency, corruption, poor value for money in the use of public 
funds and draining the resources of the Treasury (IPPR, 2011; Schillinger, 2006). SOEs 
are continuously being reprimanded by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts for recurring contraventions of financial regulations such as the State 
Finance Act and the Treasury Instructions (Ihuhua, 2013). Although most of the SOEs 
have ACs in their governance structures, the problems arising with some of the SOEs 
call into question the effectiveness of these ACs as part of the governance processes. 
 
The question that this study seeks to address is: 
 
• Which factors contribute to the effectiveness of ACs at selected Namibian SOEs 
to provide sound corporate governance? 
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1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
The study seeks to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected 
Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. 
  
1.4 THESIS STATEMENT 
 
This thesis is based on the premise that an effective audit committee will enhance 
corporate governance in SOEs in Namibia. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The NamCode was released in Namibia in 2014, bringing about changes in the 
governance environment (NSX, 2014). However, the governance principles of the code 
are applied on a voluntary ‘apply or explain’ basis, with Namibia yet to enact some of 
these principles and practices as legislation, as has been the case in South Africa and 
the US. Although the NamCode applies to all Namibian entities, including SOEs, few 
SOEs have actually adopted the NamCode to improve their corporate governance 
practices, as evidenced in their annual reports. Therefore, this study seeks to inform 
SOEs in Namibia about the important role effective ACs can play in improving their 
corporate governance practices. Moreover, the study provides valuable insights on the 
operation of ACs in the Namibian public sector, a field which is at present largely under-
researched. 
 
1.6 DELINEATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The study examines the Namibian public sector, with a specific focus on SOEs. The 
research does not attempt to prescribe how ACs should execute their functions but 
recommends what is considered to be best practice to improve the effectiveness of 
ACs. The findings cannot be generalised to all Namibian organisations because only the 
ACs of three SOEs were included in the qualitative study, which is inherently subjective 
in nature. 
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1.7 DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Audit committee – A committee of selected members of the board of directors which is 
responsible, among other things, for overseeing financial reporting and internal financial 
controls as well as identifying and managing financial risk and disclosure (IoDSA, 
2009:3.1:1).  
 
Best practice – A method or technique that has consistently shown results superior to 
those achieved through other means and is therefore used as a benchmark (Business 
Dictionary, 2013). 
 
Corporate governance – A system or process through which entities are directed or 
controlled (Jackson & Stent, 2005:4/5). 
 
Independence – The ability to remain uninfluenced by others (Cambridge Dictionary, 
2018).  
 
State Owned Enterprise – An entity in which government has a controlling ownership 
of more than 50% (IPPR, 2011).  
 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
For the purposes of this study, a qualitative research approach was deemed most 
appropriate and a descriptive case study design was adopted to examine the current 
state of affairs in the Namibian SOE’s ACs. A qualitative approach allowed the 
researcher to explore different perspectives, experiences, qualities and complexities of 
ACs and give meaning to them (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002:143). Descriptive 
case studies are used to describe an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life 
context in which it occurs (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The research covered the contextual 
conditions of the ACs and the case study design provided insights into the nature of 
ACs, based on their existing practices (Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
The researcher purposively identified three cases (SOEs) with established ACs and 
internal audit functions in Namibia. Because of the in-depth nature of the study, 
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Cormack (2000) suggests the use of a small, selective sample. Three SOEs were 
therefore considered adequate to provide rich data.  
 
The empirical data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews using 
open-ended questions to obtain testimonial evidence from the participants (Gleim, 
2011:253). Data was also collected from field notes and relevant SOE documents. All 
interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and were thereafter transcribed. 
The transcribed data was summarised, organised and categorised into different themes. 
The data analysis was conducted using Atlas.ti, version 8, Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Analysis Software.  During the data analysis, similar codes were linked and 
grouped to form categories. The categories were then reviewed and converged into 
themes. During this exercise, the researcher arrived at findings using an inductive 
process of reasoning which involved making concrete observations and analysing the 
data to arrive at new and general concepts (Yin, 2011). The analysis and interpretation 
of the empirical data allowed the researcher to make observations and draw 
conclusions about ACs at Namibian SOEs. 
 
As recommended by Krefting (1990) and taken from (Guba, 1981), the following 
principles were upheld to enhance the robustness and trustworthiness of the study: 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
 
1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The researcher respected and valued the human rights and privacy of the interviewees 
and confidentiality was maintained at all times. All findings are presented in a 
confidential manner and no personal or identifiable information was recorded or printed 
in the study. Thus, no names are included in the dissertation and the participants’ 
responses are not identifiable. All participants’ experiences and perceptions are 
portrayed as they were stated in the interviews. No false information or accusations are 
included. The findings of one SOE are not compared to that of another, however, as 
more information was gathered during the interviews, the questions were constantly 
adjusted. After transcription, the data was stored in password-protected folders on an 
external hard drive which was only accessible by the researcher. 
 
  
7 
Interviewees’ participation was voluntary. The participants signed letters of consent 
before the interviews and were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. However, as suggested by Kelly and Simpson (2001), to prevent interviewees 
from withdrawing, the researcher maintained close consultation and inclusion with all 
participants throughout the research process.  
 
1.10 CHAPTER OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The dissertation comprises five chapters, each containing detailed descriptions of 
activities carried out in this study. The content of the chapters is summarised below. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overall picture of the study by delineating the background, 
introducing ACs and emphasising their importance within the corporate governance 
spectrum. The chapter then set out the problem statement, the research objective, 
thesis statement and delineation of the study. Key terms and concepts were briefly 
defined and the research methodology and ethical considerations were discussed.  
 
Chapter 2: Audit Committees as part of Corporate Governance Practices 
 
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the AC as part of corporate 
governance practices, followed by a discussion of the public sector and SOEs in 
Namibia. Corporate governance structures are then described, followed by a discussion 
of the AC concept, its origin and development and definition, as well as the governance 
purpose and responsibilities of the AC. The chapter goes on to enumerate the benefits 
of having an effective AC and the changing expectations of ACs within the context of 
SOEs. Finally the chapter described the factors generally accepted as influencing the 
effectiveness of ACs.  
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the research approach and design, the selection of cases and 
participants, data collection and data analysis. The research trustworthiness and ethical 
considerations are also discussed. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Discussion of Findings  
 
Here the empirical findings obtained from interviews with participants and corroborated 
sources are presented and discussed. This chapter also details how the data collected 
throughout the study was transformed into meaningful information. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This final chapter discusses the significant findings in relation to the objective of the 
study, draws conclusions based on these findings and makes recommendations. The 
chapter also reflects on the limitations of the study, makes recommendations for future 
research and highlights the significance of the study. 
 
1.11 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided the background to the problem statement and introduced the 
research objective, which is to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in 
selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The thesis statement 
and delineations of the study were also briefly discussed. This study sets out to inform 
the SOEs in Namibia about the important role ACs can play in enhancing corporate 
governance. In particular, it contributes to the development of knowledge about the 
operation of ACs in Namibia’s public sector. The chapter also defined key terms and 
concepts and briefly discussed the research methodology and ethical considerations. 
Finally, the chapter provided the layout of the rest of the study. 
 
The next chapter will focus on the AC as part of the corporate governance practices of 
Namibian SOEs. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEES AS PART OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 provided the background to the problem statement and introduced the 
research objective. This was followed by the thesis statement and delineation of the 
study. Thereafter, the research methodology and ethical considerations were briefly 
discussed. Finally, the chapter ended with a presentation of the layout of the study. 
 
This chapter will provide a focused review of relevant literature about the AC as part of 
corporate governance practices, followed by a discussion of the public sector and SOEs 
in Namibia. Next, this chapter will discuss the corporate governance structure, define 
the AC concept and provide a historical background to the origin and development of 
ACs, including the governance purpose and responsibilities of the AC.  This will be 
followed by a discussion of the benefits of an effective AC and the changing 
expectations of the AC. Finally, the factors generally accepted to influence the 
effectiveness of ACs will be discussed.  
 
2.2 AUDIT COMMITTEES AS PART OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In corporate entities, ACs are essential mechanisms used universally to monitor the 
financial reporting process and to enhance corporate governance practices (AICPA, 
2010). Accordingly, the SOX Act in the US firmly places the responsibility for the 
integrity of financial reports issued by companies trading publicly in the hands of ACs, 
thus recognising ACs as necessary and responsible parties (Thiboudeau & Packwood, 
2008:39). Likewise, in the public service sector, ACs can assist organisations such as 
SOEs to establish accountability for the services that they provide to taxpayers and 
citizens which can result in improved financial reporting, appropriate action against 
parties involved in fraud and enhanced internal and external audit functions (AICPA, 
2010). Like all public sector organisations, SOEs are expected to be transparent and 
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accountable by establishing various governance structures, including ACs (AICPA, 
2010).  
 
Since the origin of ACs, there has been a significant focus on using these bodies to 
improve governance practices and financial reporting processes (Bhasin, 2016; IFAC, 
2014). However, much of the focus has been on the private sector which has been at 
the forefront in advocating the benefits of ACs, which include implementing robust 
governance codes and internal governance mechanisms. This can no doubt be 
attributed to the high number of corporate failures in recent years (Ellwood & Lacalle, 
2015; Robertson, 2006). Nevertheless, governance in the public sector deserves the 
same attention as in the private sector and similar practices could be equally applied to 
ACs in the public sector (Robertson, 2006). It is therefore the express intention of this 
study to discuss ACs and fit these to the circumstances of the public sector, specifically 
SOEs.  
 
There are no specific international standards or recommendations adopted worldwide 
for the establishment of ACs, whether in the private or the public sector (Hepworth & De 
Koning, 2012). However, to improve corporate governance, different countries have 
developed legislation and guidelines that underpin the functioning of ACs. For example, 
the King Reports on Corporate Governance in South Africa (IoDSA, 2016; IoDSA, 2009; 
IoDSA, 2002; IoDSA, 1994), the Cadbury Report of 1992 in the UK (Cadbury Report, 
1992), the UK Corporate Governance Code in the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 
2012; Financial Reporting Council, 2003) and the NamCode in Namibia (NSX, 2014). 
AC practices are therefore to a large extent influenced by the environment in which the 
AC operates (Golalipour, 2016; Vanasco, 1994).  
 
In the public sector, the requirements for the establishment of an AC are often codified 
in legislation governing a specific entity or in a resolution adopted by an elected 
governing board (Armitage, 2011). In Namibia, the NamCode provides guidance for the 
effective establishment and functioning of ACs in the public sector, however, the 
application of the code is voluntary, on an ‘apply or explain’ basis and Namibia is yet to 
legislate some of the principles and best practices of the NamCode (NSX, 2014).  
 
  
11 
2.3 THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA 
 
The public sector in Namibia has its roots in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 
(Constitution) (Namibia, 2010). The Constitution (Namibia, 2010, art 32(3)(g)) provides 
that it is within the President’s functions, powers and duties to establish government 
ministries and departments. Furthermore, according to the Constitution, the President 
must appoint cabinet members (Namibia, 2010, art 35(1)) whose duties and functions 
include directing, co-ordinating and supervising activities of government ministries and 
departments, including SOEs (Namibia, 2010, art 40(a)). In addition, the Constitution 
makes provision for regional and local units (Namibia, 2010, art 102). The public sector 
in Namibia therefore comprises government ministries, departments, regional and local 
government authorities and SOEs. 
 
SOEs in Namibia are split into three categories, namely, commercial SOEs, non-
commercial SOEs and financial institutions (IPPR, 2017). Commercial SOEs fall under 
the Ministry of Public Enterprises, non-commercial SOEs fall under specific government 
ministries or departments which are closely linked to their economic sector or business 
activity while the financial institutions fall under the Ministry of Finance (IPPR, 2017). 
The SOEs in Namibia are classified either as State Owned Enterprises, established by 
an Act of Parliament, or as State Owned Companies, established through the 
Companies Act, No. 28 of 2004 (Namibia, 2015). For example, NAMWATER was 
established by the Namibia Water Corporation Act, No. 12 of 1997 while Namibia Power 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd (NAMPOWER) is a private company established through the 
Companies Act, No. 28 of 2004.  
 
Although the SOEs are expected to comply with the specific Act that established their 
existence, all SOEs in Namibia are governed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Public Enterprises Governance Amendment Act, No. 8 of 2015 (Public Enterprises 
Governance Amendment Act) (Namibia, 2015). This Act provides for effective 
governance of SOEs, monitoring of performance and restructuring of the SOEs through 
the establishment of the Ministry of Public Enterprises (Namibia, 2015). The Act does 
not, however, make provision for ACs. The Ministry of Public Enterprises’ functions, are 
among others, to put in place corporate governance principles for SOEs.  The minister 
under which a particular SOE resides is known as the portfolio minister and oversees 
the entire administration of the SOE, including making sure that an appropriate 
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governance structure is in place (Namibia, 2015). The portfolio minister is responsible 
for the appointment of the board in consultation with the Minister of Public Enterprises 
(Namibia, 2015). The portfolio minister also has a duty to enter into governance 
agreements collectively with the board of the SOE and individually with each board 
member (Namibia, 2015). Likewise, the board will also enter into governance 
agreements with the chief executive officer (CEO) of the SOE as well as with other 
senior management.  
 
2.4 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
Corporate governance is defined as a set of procedures by which companies are 
controlled and organised (Cadbury Report, 1992:par. 2.5). Ellwood and Lacalle 
(2015:1141) define corporate governance within the context of the public sector as 
being concerned with processes and structures for making decisions and with the 
behaviour and controls that support effective accountability for performance outcomes. 
The King IV Report (IoDSA, 2016) summarises corporate governance as ensuring 
productive and responsible leadership characterised by the ethical values of 
responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. Robertson (2006:22) notes that 
governance is linked to accountability which is essentially about performance. Because 
of this linkage, good governance should ultimately lead to better public sector 
management, which in turn should improve public sector performance (Robertson, 
2006:22). There are many definitions of corporate governance but in principle, it refers 
to how companies are governed and managed (Marx, 2008). The AC is thus positioned 
as part of the wider corporate governance structure (Ellwood & Lacalle, 2015).  
 
In the private sector, within the corporate governance structure, the shareholders, and 
in some instances, the stakeholders, nominate and appoint the board of directors, 
commonly referred to as the board (Mauritius Institute of Directors, 2012; Companies 
Act 28, 2004). The board is the company’s governing body and is the source of 
authority and overall direction to management (Companies Act 28, 2004). The board is 
accountable to the shareholders (Mauritius Institute of Directors, 2012) and performs 
oversight responsibilities which involve maintaining the integrity of the company’s 
financial statements, ensuring compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, 
validating the external auditor’s qualifications and independence and providing oversight 
of the internal auditing function and external auditors (Thibodeau & Packwood, 2008). 
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The board is expected to be at the forefront of an effective corporate governance 
framework by overseeing management, which performs the day-to-day functions (Marx, 
2008). To assist the board in fulfilling its oversight role effectively, the board appoints an 
AC. The AC is a sub-unit or a sub-committee of the board and consists of board 
members with specific expertise to assist and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the board (Hansye, 2012; Marx, 2008).  
 
In the public sector, the definition of the term ‘board’ varies from country to country, by 
jurisdiction and among different levels of government (IIA, 2014:4). For example, in a 
developing country such as Namibia structures exist which relate to the Westminster 
Model (a democratic system of government modelled after that of the UK), the board’s 
responsibilities are vested in a single individual, often referred to as a permanent 
secretary or accounting officer (CRS, 2005). In countries with a congressional system (a 
system of government in which the head of government, who is the President, holds the 
executive authority, is not a member of the legislature and is separately elected), the 
board’s responsibilities are vested in an individual with titles such as secretary, director, 
or CEO (IIA, 2014:4; CRS, 2005). Other jurisdictions use different terms. The term 
‘board’, according to the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2014:4), can also refer to 
legislative bodies such as state legislatures or city councils in state or local 
governments. In a Namibian dispensation, SOEs have independent boards, similar to 
the structure used in the private sector. In Namibia, the corporate governance 
framework of public sector SOEs is regulated by the Public Enterprises Governance 
Amendment Act (Namibia, 2015). As per this Act, the portfolio minister of the ministry 
under which a specific SOE resides, represents the state as the major shareholder in 
the specific SOE and has the responsibility of appointing the board of the SOE 
(Namibia, 2015).  
 
In Namibia there are no specific mandatory, regulatory or legislative requirements for 
the establishment of public sector ACs, although many SOEs have established ACs. 
However, in 2014, the NSX published the NamCode based on the King Reports of 
corporate governance in South Africa (NSX, 2014). The NamCode makes provision for 
corporate governance principles and recommendations for all Namibian corporate 
entities, on a voluntary basis of ‘apply or explain’ (NSX, 2014). The NamCode also 
contains guidelines for the establishment of ACs, membership and resources, internal 
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and external assurance providers and reporting of ACs. The NamCode is applicable to 
all Namibian companies, including SOEs.  
 
2.5 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
There have been gradual changes in the development of ACs since their inception and 
their roles and responsibilities have evolved significantly over the years (Braiotta et al., 
2010). Literature reveals that the AC concept as we know it today dates back to the 
1940s (Böhm, Bollen & Hassink, 2016; Braiotta et al., 2010; SEC, 2007; Munoz, 2005; 
Walker, 2004). In particular, the McKesson and Robbins case in the US was one of the 
events that led to the establishment of ACs (Braiotta et al., 2010). This case, which 
involved the falsification of sales and inventories records, raised questions about the 
independence of external auditors from management. As a result, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) suggested that a special committee of outside directors, selected 
from the board, be established to make recommendations to shareholders on the 
appointment of external auditors (Braiotta et al., 2010). Although this committee was not 
specifically referred to as the AC, numerous companies did establish ACs as a result of 
the suggestion made by the NYSE. At that stage, however, the AC concept received 
little support and its functions remained undefined (Braiotta et al., 2010). 
 
The term ‘AC’ was first used during the 1970s and ACs have since became widely 
accepted as an integral part of good governance. There were nonetheless several court 
cases where the establishment of ACs was enforced (Braiotta et al., 2010; Walker, 
2004; Vanasco, 1994). In 1972, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made 
it a rule to establish ACs consisting of outside directors by all publicly traded companies 
in the USA. Business and financial communities as well as shareholders were urged to 
give their full support to the effective implementation of ACs (Hansye, 2012; Walker, 
2004). In Canada, several acts called for the establishment of ACs. For example, the 
Ontario Business Corporation Act of 1979 made it a legal requirement for corporations 
to submit their financial statements to ACs first, before submitting them to the board 
(Braiotta et al., 2010). From the 1970s onwards, in Australia the establishment of ACs 
was required by law, while in the UK the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Cadbury Committee) (1992) issued a report that included a 
Code of Best Practice for the establishment of ACs (Braiotta et al., 2010). Elsewhere, in 
general, considerable attention was given to ACs. For example, in South Africa, the 
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King I Report on Corporate Governance was released in 1994, later to be followed by 
King II, King III and King IV (IoDSA, 2016; IoDSA, 2009; IoDSA, 2002; IoDSA, 1994). 
The PFMA (South Africa, 1999) was also enacted in South Africa while in the US, the 
SOX Act was introduced.  
 
Initially, ACs focused primarily on overseeing the financial reporting process, selecting 
external auditors and accepting audit results (Fitchner, 2009; Hunt & Carey, 2001:37). 
However, several incidents of fraudulent financial reporting, major corporate failures, 
defalcations, accounting method choice abuses and ‘opinion shopping’ led to the 
realisation by shareholders that boards were not effectively carrying out their oversight 
function (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). Over years, irregular activities in corporate 
organisations led to regulatory reforms and the establishment of increased 
responsibilities for the AC (Munoz, 2005; IoDSA, 1994). One such regulatory reform 
occurred in 1999, when the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), co-sponsored by the NYSE 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), made several 
recommendations for improving the oversight effectiveness of ACs and promoting 
quality financial reporting in order to effect changes in the functions and expectations 
placed on ACs (Munoz, 2005). Another reform took place in 2002 when the SOX Act 
increased ACs’ responsibilities and set additional requirements as to the composition of 
the AC to include more independent directors (Munoz, 2005). In response, the SEC and 
the US stock exchanges proposed new rules and regulations to strengthen ACs. For 
instance, ACs became responsible for pre-approving audit and non-audit services, 
overseeing the audit engagement and auditors’ compensation (Munoz, 2005).  
 
The evolution of ACs as discussed above, occurred in multi-country dispensations. One 
country, however, did not necessarily adopt what was decided in another country. The 
chronological listing of the development of AC responsibilities is shown in table 2.1. 
  
  
16 
Table 2.1 Chronological listing of the evolution of AC responsibilities  
Timeframe Responsibility of AC Authority Country Sources 
1972 All public traded companies 
should establish ACs 
comprising of outside directors 
SEC US Hansye (2012), 
Walker (2004) 
1979 In terms of the Business 
Corporation Act of 1979, 
corporations must first submit 
their financial statements to the 
AC, before submitting them to 
the board 
Parliament of 
Canada 
Canada Braiotta et al., 
2010 
1992 Report issued that included a 
Code of Best Practice for the 
establishment of ACs 
Cadbury 
Committee 
UK (Braiotta et al., 
2010) 
1993 Mandatory requirement for all 
listed companies to have an AC 
Australian 
Securities 
Exchange 
Australia Lama (2011) 
1994, 2002, 
2009, 2016 
Considerable attention given to 
the establishment of ACs in the 
various iterations of the King 
Reports on Corporate 
Governance 
IoDSA South 
Africa 
IoDSA      
(2016), IoDSA 
(2009), IoDSA 
(2002, IoDSA 
(1994) 
1999 Recommendations made for 
improving the oversight 
effectiveness of ACs and 
promoting quality financial 
reporting 
NYSE and 
NASD 
US Munoz (2005) 
2002 ACs’ responsibilities increased 
and additional requirements for 
the composition of the AC to 
include more independent 
directors 
SEC US Munoz (2005) 
2014 NamCode on Corporate 
Governance released with 
considerable attention given to 
ACs 
NSX Namibia NSX (2014) 
  
  
17 
In conclusion to this section, ACs as we know them today, have evolved considerably 
since their inception in the 1940s. The governance codes, legislation and regulatory 
practices that regulate ACs have been amended throughout history to adapt to 
challenges facing businesses in an ever-evolving world. 
 
2.6 DEFINITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE CONCEPT 
 
Literature does not have a universal definition for the term ‘AC’, although the term is 
commonly used in recommendations of corporate governance codes and legislative 
requirements (Marx, 2008). The definitions and attributes associated with the concept of 
the AC today have evolved over many years. The Accountant International Study Group 
(1977:2) defines an AC as a “committee comprising of directors of an entity whose 
specific duty is to review the annual financial statements before submission to the 
board”. Similarly, Podgorski (1983:4) refers to an AC as “a standing committee of an 
entity’s board of directors, composed mainly of non-executive directors”.  
 
Without giving a definition, the King I Report on Corporate Governance states that the 
board should establish an AC, with the majority of its members consisting of non-
executive directors with written terms of reference approved by the board (IoDSA, 
1994:20.7). The King II Report on Corporate Governance is more exact in defining the 
AC, stating that the AC is regarded as a committee of the board, consisting of a majority 
of non-executive directors (IoDSA, 2002:5.3). The King III Report, on the other hand, 
states that regardless of its size, a company should be fully committed to the goal of 
supporting and maintaining an effective AC which consists exclusively of independent 
non-executive directors (IoDSA, 2009:3.2). The King IV Report, however, states that the 
AC should collectively have the necessary financial literacy, skills and experience to 
execute its duties effectively (IoDSA, 2016:7.55). 
 
The SOX Act does not have an exact definition for the AC either although it does state 
that “there shall be a committee established by and amongst the members of the board 
of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the financial and accounting 
reporting process of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer” 
(USA, 2002:3A). DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed (2002) define the AC 
as a committee comprising qualified members with authority and resources to protect 
stakeholders’ interests. The Combined Code in the UK (2006), without defining the AC, 
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states that the board should establish an AC of at least three, or in the case of smaller 
companies, two members (Financial Reporting Council, 2006:C.3.1). Golalipour 
(2016:377) refers to the AC as an operating sub-committee of the board which assists 
the board in fulfilling its corporate governance and oversight duties relating to financial 
reporting and disclosure, internal control, risk management and internal and external 
audit functions. 
 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the AC is a sub-committee of the 
board. Its members should be independent, non-executive directors who collectively 
have the necessary financial literacy, skills and experience to execute their duties 
effectively. The AC as a sub-committee of the board is tasked with carrying out certain 
duties on behalf of the board, as directed by its members. These tasks form the terms of 
reference for the functioning of the AC. 
 
2.7 GOVERNANCE PURPOSE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
 
This section discusses the various governance responsibilities of the AC in financial 
reporting, internal audit, external auditors, compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, risk management and powers exercised by the AC. These responsibilities 
underpin the main purpose of establishing an AC within an organisation. 
 
Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) and Cohen, Krishmoorth and Wright (2004) state that the 
AC can be influential in enhancing corporate governance, which could lead to improved 
and quality financial reporting, subsequently boosting investor confidence in corporate 
reporting. Similarly, Robertson (2006:22) observes that there is a strong connection 
between the AC and sound governance in enhancing organisational performance. The 
promotion of ACs is aimed at minimising weaknesses that may exist in corporate 
governance systems (Turley & Zuman, 2004:305). 
 
The AC is expected to have close oversight of the activities associated with the 
company’s financial reporting procedures and internal controls to uphold the integrity of 
the company (Kusnadi et al., 2015; Oshima, 2005). This can be achieved through the 
AC reviewing major accounting and reporting matters and assessing their effect; this 
includes complex or unusual transactions, major issues concerning accounting 
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principles and financial statement presentation as well as analysis of information 
prepared by management (Kusnadi et al., 2015; Munoz, 2005). ACs should comment 
on and approve adopted accounting policies; they are also expected to have a strong 
influence on the company’s approach to financial reporting, levels of disclosure and 
adherence to standard practices in the industry (Bhasin, 2016; Turley & Zaman, 2004). 
Other expectations of the ACs include monitoring the reliability of the company’s 
accounting processes that produce financial reports, compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements, adherence to corporate ethical standards including 
maintenance of preventive fraud controls (Bhasin, 2016; Fitchner, 2009; Turley & 
Zaman, 2004). The AC should consider the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud control 
systems, information technology security and control in the company and understand 
the scope of the internal and external assurance providers’ review of internal control 
over financial reporting (Lee & Fargher, 2018; Munoz, 2005).  
 
The AC should discuss and review certain areas key to financial reporting − this 
includes focusing on complex areas and requesting information relating to complex 
areas, reviewing the financial statements for significant changes from year to year and 
requesting management to explain these changes, identifying unusual items such as 
income or expenses from discontinued operations and the cumulative effect of 
accounting changes and discussing these with management and the external auditors 
and finally, performing reviews before the interim financial statements are issued 
(Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 2009).  
 
The AC should report to the board about its assessment of the internal audit function 
and should play a significant role in ensuring that the company’s internal audit function 
remains independent and capacitated with the necessary resources, budget, standing 
and authority within the company to enable it to properly carry out its duties (Li, 2017; 
NSX, 2014:3.10:10.3.4). The AC should also review the internal audit structure, staffing, 
qualifications and the internal audit procedures (Li, 2017; Oshima, 2005). In order to 
strengthen and enhance the integrity of the internal audit process, the AC should play a 
key role in appointing, reviewing and recommending the salary structure, and retaining 
the organisation’s Chief Audit Executive (CAE) (NSX, 2014:3.7; Oshima, 2005). 
Together with management and the CAE, the AC should also review the charter, plans 
and activities of the internal audit function (IIA, 2017; NSX, 2014:3.7). Furthermore, the 
AC should on a regular basis satisfy itself that the internal audit function is complying 
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with the IIA’ International Professional Practice Framework and when necessary, it 
should meet with the CAE to discuss matters that should be discussed privately 
(Alzeban & Sawan, 2015; NSX, 2014:3.7).  
 
The attitude and approach of the AC towards internal audit could strengthen the internal 
audit function and make this function an important resource to the AC in fulfilling its 
responsibilities (Yasin & Nelson, 2012; Turley & Zaman, 2004). The relationship 
between the AC and the internal audit function should be characterised by formal 
meetings (Li, 2017; Munoz, 2005; Oshima, 2005). However, literature suggests that 
informal interactions between the AC and the internal audit function may complement 
formal meetings and may provide the AC with an opportunity to monitor the internal 
audit function (Zaman & Sarens, 2013; Munoz, 2005). Interactions, both formal and 
informal, between the AC and the internal audit function are thus important for the AC to 
fulfil its oversight role.  
 
With regard to oversight of the company’s external auditing issues, the AC must 
approve the appointment of the external auditor and resolve any disagreements 
between management and the company’s external auditors. Where necessary, it may 
also meet with the external auditors privately (Lisic, Meyers & Zhou, 2014; NSX, 
2014:3.9; Oshima, 2005:50). The AC must also evaluate the performance of the 
external auditors, review the scope and staffing of the external audit team, and review 
the external auditors’ work plan (NSX, 2014; Oshima, 2005:50). In addition, according to 
the NamCode the AC must review, monitor and report on the external auditor’s 
independence and objectivity, define a policy for board approval, address the nature, 
extent and terms under which the external auditor may perform non-audit services, 
approve the external auditor’s terms of engagement and remuneration by satisfying 
itself that the level of remuneration is appropriate for an effective audit to be conducted 
and lastly, at the end of each annual audit, review the quality and effectiveness of the 
audit process (NSX, 2014:3.9). To strengthen the external auditor’s independence, the 
AC should ensure that the lead audit partner is rotated at least every five years and with 
effect from 2023 the audit firm should not be appointed as the auditor for more than 10 
consecutive years (IRBA, 2017). It should also set clear policies for hiring employees or 
former employees of the external auditor (Lisic et al., 2014).  
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The AC should review and satisfy itself that the system for monitoring compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations is effective (NSX, 2014:3.4). It should review the 
findings resulting from the examination by regulatory agencies such as the tax 
regulatory body and obtain regular updates from management and the company’s legal 
counsel regarding compliance with legal and regulatory requirements (Turley & Zaman, 
2004). 
 
The AC should also be responsible for making sure that significant risks facing the 
company are adequately addressed by management (NSX, 2014:3.8). This includes 
risks in the areas of financial reporting, internal financial controls, fraud relating to 
financial reporting and information technology (NSX, 2014:3.8:5.7). The AC should 
discuss risk management programmes, including the minimisation of present and future 
litigation risk and policies and procedures addressing risk with management (Oshima, 
2005). 
 
It is within the AC’s power to carry out and sanction investigations into any other matters 
within its scope of responsibility (Puri, Trehan & Kakkar, 2010). The AC should seek 
independent advice from experts to assist in conducting an investigation and seek any 
information it may require from employees (Hundal, 2013). 
 
Finally, within the context of what ACs are expected to do, it is the responsibility of the 
AC to report on an annual basis on how it carried out its duties (NSX, 2014:3.10; 
Armitage, 2011). The AC report should be included in the company’s annual report.  
 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that there is a clear connection between the 
AC and sound governance. Through its oversight function, the AC can be influential in 
promoting corporate governance which could lead to improved and quality financial 
reporting in SOEs. The AC should have both formal and informal interactions with the 
SOE’s internal auditors and should be instrumental in the appointment, remuneration 
and review of the scope of the work of the external auditors. The existence of an AC at 
a SOE fosters an environment of compliance with applicable laws and regulatory 
requirements. Finally, as part of its duties, the AC of a SOE should satisfy itself that 
significant risks facing the entity are adequately addressed.    
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2.8 BENEFITS OF AN EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
 
An effectively functioning AC can be of great benefit to an organisation. These benefits 
depend, however, on the AC having appropriate and sufficient members, focusing on 
quality work, comprising the right expertise and having the support of management (Van 
der Nest, 2008:181). In the context of government SOEs, an effective AC could assist in 
establishing accountability within government because it would devote its focus to 
issues associated with accountability and transparency (Ellwood & Lacalle, 2016; 
Shulman & Kim, 2011). In so doing, it could result in additional benefits such as 
improved financial practices and reporting, appropriate action against fraud and 
enhanced internal and external audit functions (Sharma, Sharma & Ananthanarayanan, 
2011; AICPA, 2010).  
 
The consequences of an ineffective AC are seen in errors and misstatements in 
financial information, the misuse of confidential information or frequent restatements of 
prior period errors (Larry & Taylor, 2011). An AC that is actively functioning is more 
likely to detect problems compared to an inactive one (Alleyne, Howard & Greenidge, 
2006). Although the ineffectiveness of ACs does not automatically suggest failure, when 
ACs do fail in their duties, various stakeholders may suffer (Sommer, 1991). 
 
ACs can mitigate threats to external auditors’ independence which serves to enhance 
the quality of financial reporting (Sharma et al., 2011:151; Turley & Zaman 2004:313). 
Furthermore, Turley and Zaman (2004) note that independent and effective ACs are 
associated with the decreased likelihood of fraud and irregularities in the financial 
statements. ACs also have the ability to strengthen the oversight capacity of the board 
in the area of reporting and also strengthen communication between management and 
the external auditors (Salehi, Zanjidar & Zarei, 2012).  
 
The presence of an AC in the organisation, particularly in a SOE, can play a key role in 
regulating the ethical conduct of management and employees (Nashwa, 2005:45). This 
includes numerous advantages such as an independent internal audit function which 
operates efficiently and effectively, resulting in the integrity and efficiency of the audit 
process, a framework for managing risk and an environment where managing risk is a 
priority, the adoption of sound corporate governance practices as a norm, an internal 
control system which functions adequately and effectively and the creation of a culture 
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where instances of fraud and corruption are effectively addressed (Van der Nest, 
2008:181). 
 
With regard to legal protection, Turley and Zaman (2004:313) explain that the existence 
of an AC is evidence that the board has acted with due care in performing its oversight 
duties, which should minimise any potential legal exposure the board may face. 
However, the legal protection is likely to be influenced by the specific legal context in 
different countries and should not necessarily be construed as a universal justification 
for the establishment of ACs internationally. In the case of Namibian organisations, the 
board can delegate any of its powers to a committee such as the AC but this does not 
imply that the board has abdicated powers delegated to the AC (Namibia, 2004). 
 
The existence of an effective AC may improve the quality of public financial 
management and governance. However, it does not necessarily mean that 
organisations with established ACs function well and have no problems with issues of 
governance, internal control or financial reporting (Hepworth & De Koning, 2012). 
 
From the discussion above, the introduction of ACs in SOEs is likely to strengthen a 
system of transparency and accountability, mitigate any potential threat against internal 
and external auditors’ independence and minimise legal exposure. Above all, the 
existence of an AC in a SOE will yield benefits such as improved financial practices and 
reporting as well as improved public financial management and governance. 
 
2.9 CHANGING EXPECTATIONS OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
 
In recent years, the corporate landscape has been littered with numerous scandals 
(Dodo, 2017). Against this backdrop, the AC’s role in ensuring accurate and transparent 
disclosure of information has become more important than ever. Equally, the work of 
ACs has become more challenging than ever because of increased expectations from 
stakeholders (Krishnan, Wen & Zhao, 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Magrane 
& Malthus, 2010). Today’s ACs also face legal exposure because of growing 
responsibilities, increasing demands from stakeholders, a complex business and 
economic environment and changing regulatory and reporting requirements (Flanagan, 
2008). This exposure can easily threaten the effectiveness of ACs and even discourage 
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people from serving as AC members because the responsibilities that come with this 
role outweigh the rewards (Flanagan, 2008). 
 
It has become a thing of the past when ACs met only two to three times a year to 
discuss external audit matters related to audit fees and appointments. This practice did 
little to improve the effectiveness of the AC (Hunt & Carey, 2001:37). Traditionally, the 
ACs’ duties focused on three areas: i) accounting and financial reporting, ii) auditing and 
iii) corporate governance (Wolnizer, 1995). However, the ACs’ duties have since 
evolved.  ACs, especially of SOEs, face difficult agendas to scrutinise management 
processes to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of systems and controls, answer 
any questions that may arise, cope with the lack of trust from the public when things go 
wrong and prevent fraud (Carlson, 2015; CBG, 2011; Fitchner, 2009; Hunt & Carey, 
2001).  
 
The AC is expected to be an important component of effective risk management and if it 
is not proactive in providing oversight of the quality and trustworthiness of the financial 
reporting process, its contribution is of little value (Krishnamoorthy, Wright & Cohen, 
2002:56). In addition to risk management, the mandate of the AC has been extended to 
non-financial compliance requirements and audit and assurance activities indirectly 
related to financial reports (Bennie, Soh & Tweedie, 2015). Typically, the expectations 
of the AC include financial reporting integrity, external and internal audit, risk 
management, internal control compliance and liaison between the board, management 
and internal and external auditors (AUASB, AICD & IIA, 2012). Now more than ever, it 
has become important for the AC and the board to be sensitive to the challenges faced 
by the AC in effectively meeting its responsibilities, as set out in the terms of reference. 
ACs have been placed under the spotlight as SOEs’ financial management and 
reporting are under continuous scrutiny by the public, institutional investors and others 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005:4). The ACs’ workload and the need to establish strong 
working relationships with management and auditors are driven by increasing 
responsibilities. Certainly, SOE ACs should be concerned about carrying out their duties 
effectively and with appropriate mindfulness, as compliance alone is not enough 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005:4). 
 
ACs should strike an appropriate balance between overseeing and advising 
management, while avoiding involvement at operational level 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005:5). Many countries, including Namibia, have 
recognised the importance of establishing ACs in SOEs to improve the integrity of 
corporate governance processes. However, it is important that ACs conduct their 
activities in an effective and efficient manner to help the boards carry out their financial 
and fiduciary responsibilities to stakeholders (Braiotta et al., 2010). 
 
In the Namibian context, the AC should be set up to fit the circumstances of the SOE 
(IIA, 2014). This can be achieved by setting the right ‘tone at the top’ by the SOE’s 
leadership, particularly the board, which fosters an environment within which the AC can 
thrive (Hepworth & De Koning, 2012). It may also require leadership that is selfless, 
objective, available, open, honest and provides leadership to the entire organisation 
(Hepworth & De Koning, 2012). However, the ACs’ success in public sector SOEs will 
depend on the establishment of applicable regulations and legislation with specific rules 
and guidelines that have definitions and minimum standards. These should be readily 
available for consultation by the directors serving on ACs (NSX, 2014; Hepworth & De 
Koning, 2012).  
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the role of ACs is expanding because of 
the need to meet the challenges of the constantly changing business, social and 
economic environment and also because of the value it has to add to the board and 
stakeholders. 
 
2.10 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEES  
 
This section discusses the factors influencing the effectiveness of SOE ACs. The 
mandate of the AC is considered first, followed by the composition of the AC and the 
management of its activities. The section then looks at performance assessment and 
reporting. These factors form the theoretical framework that will be used to determine 
whether or not ACs are effective in strengthening Namibian SOEs’ corporate 
governance practices and to provide recommendations to enhance such effectiveness. 
 
Effectiveness can be defined as the extent to which the desired outcome is successfully 
attained (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). Effectiveness is also about doing the right things 
right. In the context of ACs, effectiveness refers to the AC members’ collective ability to 
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achieve the committee’s oversight objectives (DeZoort, 1998). The effectiveness of an 
AC is dependent on its members’ commitment to carry out their duties and is viewed as 
the competency with which the AC carries out its specific oversight responsibilities 
(Ionescu, 2014; Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). Effectiveness implies having the necessary 
capabilities to achieve the desired results and may also entail increasing the level of 
control and accountability experienced by the entity (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). 
Similarly, ACs’ effectiveness lies in its ability and desire to perform its duties. Many ACs 
exist today but the degree to which they are effective varies greatly (Armitage, 2011; 
Abbott, Park & Parker, 2000). 
 
According to literature, the effectiveness of ACs was being questioned for some time 
now in the light of various corporate and financial scandals, with many stakeholders 
suggesting that cases of fraudulent financial reporting could be minimised by improving 
the effectiveness of ACs (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015; Malik, 2014; Myers & Ziegenfus, 
2006; NACD, 2000; BRC, 1999; GAO, 1996). Stakeholders indicate that an effective AC 
is not only aware of its responsibilities but also completely appreciates and understands 
them; it also recognises what is necessary to fulfil them (Bhasin, 2016; Van der Nest, 
2008).  
 
AC effectiveness has been examined in many ways and researchers agree that the 
concept is multidimensional and may involve, among others, a variety of factors such as 
mandate, characteristics of the AC and its members, management of the AC business, 
conformity with industrial norms and prescribe standards, resources required and 
monitoring the performance of the AC (Magrane & Malthus, 2010; Bedard & Gendron, 
2005; Abbott et al., 2000; DeZoort, 1998). The tasks performed by the ACs of different 
companies may be fairly similar, however, the operating methods and style differ and 
should be tailor-made to the needs, objectives and circumstances of the specific AC 
(Popescu, Popescus & Eid, 2015). Ultimately, the effectiveness of the AC depends on 
efforts and attributes of AC members in performing their roles and making sense of why 
they do what they do (Wu, 2012). 
 
Although much of the literature on AC effectiveness reflects on what is happening in the 
private sector, the set-up of SOEs is more or less similar to that of the private sector, 
which could easily be adopted to fit the circumstances of the SOEs in the public sector. 
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Thus, the private sector approach to governance and AC practices could be equally 
applied to the public sector (Magrane & Malthus, 2010; Robertson, 2006). 
 
2.10.1 Mandate  
 
The mandate of the AC forms the foundation for its establishment. The mandate 
provides a practical environment in which the AC has the freedom and power to carry 
out its duties by establishing an AC charter, thereby also defining who should nominate 
members to serve on the AC (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). The mandate is undoubtedly 
the first step in creating an effective AC by a SOE (Turley & Zaman, 2007). In SOEs, 
however, it is necessary to formalise the AC’s mandate through government policy (IIA, 
2014).  
 
Charter 
 
An effective AC requires a strong institutional mandate established through a well-
defined and well-written charter as well as adequate formal recognition by management 
and staff (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). The purpose of the AC charter, according to Böhm 
et al. (2016:119), is to inform the investors about the governance practices within the 
given company. However, the AC charter is not always available to external 
stakeholders. Therefore, the board of the SOE should pass a resolution approving and 
formalising written terms of reference for the AC, which should be set out in the AC 
charter.  
 
The AC charter is the road map of the AC and should inform its agenda and work plan 
to ensure that all its responsibilities are properly addressed (NSX, 2014:3.1:1.4). The 
AC charter is also a key instrument providing authority, direction and discipline to AC 
members (Böhm et al., 2016:119; BRC, 1999). The charter is therefore the most 
important foundation for achieving an effective AC and any entity implementing an AC 
should first prepare an AC charter (Armitage, 2011:97). The key question that should be 
answered by the charter is ‘‘Why do we need an AC?” (IIA, 2014; KPMG, 2009; Walker, 
2004). 
 
The charter of the AC within a SOE should clearly spell out the purpose of the AC 
including its oversight responsibilities towards financial reporting (IIA, 2014). It should 
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define the membership requirements of the AC, specifying that the members should be 
independent, non-executive directors (IIA, 2014). The charter should also clarify the role 
of the chairperson, the appointment of the secretary, the induction of AC members and 
continuous skills development (KPMG, 2009). The parameters of how the powers of the 
AC should be exercised must also be specified in the charter. This should include 
sourcing information, access to management, consultation with internal and external 
auditors and sourcing advice independently (IIA, 2014; KPMG, 2009; Redman, 2009).  
 
Although having an AC charter in place is a significant step for the SOE, this does not 
automatically imply effectiveness and much depends on the AC members appointed to 
the committee (Walker, 2004; Krishnamoorthy et al., 2002). Firstly, for the AC to be 
effective, it should comply with the established charter. Böhm et al. (2016:119) found 
evidence that the AC charters from different companies are ‘cut and paste’ copies of 
each other and the actual practices of companies are not reflected in their AC charters. 
Secondly, the success of a SOE’s AC is to a great extent dependent on clear and 
measurable strategic objectives to be achieved, within a defined period, through the AC 
charter (Salehi et al., 2012). This is necessary as it provides the framework within which 
the AC members should work, if they are to function effectively (Salehi et al., 2012). 
 
Literature suggests that the charter should be reviewed periodically, at least annually, 
by the AC and should be published once every three years in the proxy statement sent 
to the SOE’s portfolio minister (NSX, 2014:2.23; Oshima, 2005).  There should be a 
commitment by the AC members to review the charter, to ensure that it continues to be 
relevant in light of the changing business environment (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). 
 
After the AC charter has been approved by the board, the AC needs to come up with a 
thorough work plan, also to be reviewed and approved by the board (NSX, 2014:3.1; 
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario, 2009). The work plan outlines in detail how 
the AC intends to carry out its duties, as defined in the AC charter (Deloitte, 2009). The 
work plan will be the reference for determining the agendas for future AC meetings 
(Deloitte, 2009). What should be included in an AC work plan is often influenced by the 
size of the SOE and by the nature and complexity of its business activities. It should 
also be drafted in consideration of the activity plans of the internal and external auditors 
(Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario, 2009).  
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Responsibility for appointment  
 
Selecting appropriate persons to serve as members on the AC of the SOE is very 
important because the AC’s effectiveness depends to a large extent on the composition 
and interaction of AC members (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). The AC charter should 
clearly stipulate who should nominate the potential AC members. For this purpose, the 
IIA (2014) and Popescu et al. (2015) recommend that this responsibility should rest with 
the nomination committee of the board. This committee should recommend the 
appointment of AC members, and among them, the AC’s chairperson. Specifically, the 
nomination committee should consider the experience, skills and diligence of individuals 
to serve on the AC (IIA, 2014). The chairperson of the board should not be eligible for 
appointment as an AC member but may attend AC meetings by invitation (NSX, 
2014:3.2). 
 
In the public sector, for example in South Africa, the board of the SOE appoints AC 
members in consultation with the relevant executive authority (IIA, 2014). However, 
according to literature, the involvement of the CEO in appointing potential AC members 
and selecting board members, including the directors who are subsequently appointed 
to the AC, may undermine the independence of the AC. This may, in turn, reduce the 
effectiveness of the AC (Beasley et al., 2009; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose & Scholz, 
2007:1). The independence of the AC may also be compromised if management is 
involved in the appointment of AC members (Popescu et al., 2015). 
 
2.10.2 Composition  
 
The AC’s composition defines the unique qualities of the AC, namely, the number of AC 
members in terms of the AC’s size, the independence of the members, their skills and 
experience as well as their expertise in the area of finance. To be effective, the SOEs’ 
AC should possess these unique characteristics, as discussed below.   
 
Number of members  
 
The size of ACs varies. In the context of SOEs, the composition of the AC depends to a 
large extent on the size of the SOE itself, the nature and complexity of its business, the 
number of board members, the number of board committees required, the AC members 
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serving on other committees of the board, the type of experience needed on the AC and 
the duties and responsibilities as provided in the AC charter (Popescu et al., 2015; 
KPMG, 2009). 
 
A minimum of three and not more than six AC members is suggested to be the 
appropriate number (IoDSA, 2016; NSX, 2014:3.2). Less than six members means the 
committee is manageable and will also provide room for AC members to actively and 
freely participate in discussions (IIA, 2014:4; NSX, 2014:3.2). A large AC size may 
inhibit its effectiveness (Rainsbury, Malthus & Capper, 2012). However, most 
importantly, in determining the right size and composition of the AC, the guiding 
principle should be the required skills expected from AC members. Where specific skills 
are lacking among the board members, it may be necessary to appoint members on the 
AC who are not members of the board to enhance the skills and abilities of the AC 
(Bromilow & Keller, 2011).  
 
Independence 
 
Independence in the context of ACs is described as being free from management’s 
influence (Kusnadi et al., 2015; Magrane & Malthus, 2010; Krishnamoorthy et al., 
2002:57). Independence is also described as executing allocated responsibilities in an 
impartial and independent manner (Hepworth & De Koning, 2012). However, in the 
context of the public sector SOEs, where politics may play a role in the appointment of 
AC members, Hepworth and De Koning (2012) define independence as being unwilling 
to be under an obligation to the executive. 
 
Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2009:265) point to AC independence as one 
of the key aspects of its effectiveness. Without independence, Hepworth and De Koning 
(2012) argue that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for AC members to give impartial 
advice. Moreover, the benefits of AC independence are achieved only when the AC is 
completely independent (Bronson et al., 2009). According to Nashwa (2005), the 
independence of the AC is a pre-requisite for the AC’s effectiveness. The AC can only 
contribute to the integrity of the financial reporting process if it is independent, both in 
fact and in appearance, and there should be processes in place to support such 
independence (Bhasin, 2016). Independence in appearance is what an informed third 
party would reasonably conclude if that person had knowledge of all relevant 
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information that the AC member’s objectivity was compromised (KPMG, 2009). 
Independence in fact, on the other hand, is the possession of an independent mindset 
when performing duties as an AC member; it may also refer to a state of mind where an 
AC member has the freedom to express an opinion without fear or without any outside 
influence that may compromise judgement (Benjaminsson & Doherty, 2012). 
Independence according to Leblanc (2007) should be factual and practical and should 
manifest itself through action. Zaman and Sarens (2013) found that AC independence 
was to a great extent associated with informal interaction with the internal audit function 
because independent and active ACs are more likely to have greater information needs 
and are more likely to be interested in interacting with the internal audit function. 
 
For SOEs to fully realise independence of their ACs, ACs should be completely 
composed of independent directors (Chan & Li, 2008; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). The 
NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.2) recommends specifically that all members of the AC be 
independent non-executive directors. In the US, all AC members must be independent 
while the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the UK requires AC members to 
be confined to independent non-executive directors (IIA, 2014). The Ontario Securities 
Commission of Canada indicates that the AC should only have independent directors, 
while in Australia ACs must be completely independent, with the majority of members 
being independent directors (IIA, 2014). Independent directors should satisfy the 
following criteria:  
 
• They should not have been employed by the SOE or any of its associates during 
the current year or during the past five years (IIA, 2014; Lin, Kang & Rollie, 
2009:3). 
• They should not have accepted any reward for work performed for the SOE or 
any of its associates except rewards for performing board duties or receiving 
benefits from a retirement plan (Lin et al., 2009:3). 
• They should have no close family ties with anyone employed by the SOE or any 
of its associates in an influential position during the past five years (IIA, 2014; Lin 
et al., 2009:3). 
• They should not be directors who are controlling shareholders or executive 
officers of any organisation to which the SOE made or received payments that 
are considered to be significant, to the SOE or business organisation during any 
of the past five years (Lin et al., 2009:3). 
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• They should not be employed by another company as an executive where any of 
the company’s executives serve on the company’s remuneration committee (Lin 
et al., 2009:3; Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009). 
• They should not be a member of a public sector organisation which carries out 
any other activities on behalf of the company (IIA, 2014; Robinson & Owens-
Jackson, 2009). 
 
An AC that consists of independent directors is better able to assess objectively the 
quality of the SOE’s financial statements and the adequacy of internal control than an 
AC that has close ties with management (Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009; Oshima, 
2005:52). Similarly, independent directors are considered to be better equipped than 
non-independent directors to maintain the integrity of the financial statements as they 
do not have personal or economic links with executive management (Ghafran & 
O’Sullivan, 2013; Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009).  
 
ACs are regarded as referees whose role is to oversee and monitor the company’s 
executive management (Lary & Taylor, 2011:340-341; Bradbury, 1990). Hence, the 
more independent the AC, the less likely there will be changes in external auditors, who 
could easily be changed because of an unfavourable audit opinion or disagreement with 
management (Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009).  Abbott et al. (2000) and Beasley et 
al. (2000) support the view that an independent and active AC can prevent financial 
reporting aggressiveness and fraud. Furthermore, according to Abbott et al. (2000) and 
Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013), ACs consisting solely of independent directors were 
more likely to support the internal audit function by having regular meetings with the 
CAE and reviewing the internal auditing plan as well as comments made by the internal 
audit function.  
 
While independence is crucial to the operations of the AC, Alleyne et al. (2006:572) 
cautioned that AC members should strike a balance between being independent on the 
one hand, and working closely with management as non-executive directors on the 
other. A potential conflict of interest could arise when persons are expected to work with 
management to maximise shareholders’ wealth and interest whilst at the same time 
serving as members of the AC. This is because in the latter role, they are expected to 
act independently of management to achieve sound corporate governance (Alleyne et 
al., 2006:572). The independence of non-executive members serving on the AC thus 
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needs to be strengthened (Salehi et al., 2012). Independence is regarded as essential 
to the success of ACs and it is necessary for the company to set clear and defined rules 
and guidelines on the issue of independence (Hepworth & De Koning, 2012). 
 
There is evidence to suggest that independence may be compromised if AC members 
receive compensation in the form of shares in an entity (Hundal, 2013). This ownership 
interest could impair the objectivity of AC members (Reidenbach, 2013) who may 
connive with management to unfairly influence the financial reports by overstating the 
results (Hundal, 2013). Other evidence suggests that AC influence on the financial 
results depends on the circumstances of the entity and the options available for AC 
members to exercise in relation to shares as a form of compensation (Bierstacker, 
Cohen, DeZoort & Hermanson, 2012; Lynch & Williams, 2012). Independence is more 
likely to be compromised if AC members benefit from an increase in earnings of the 
entity, as opposed to when compensation is structured differently (Bierstacker et al., 
2012; Lynch & Williams, 2012).  
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that independent membership is fundamental to 
the success of ACs in the private sector and the public sector is no different (Hepworth 
& De Koning, 2012). It should be noted, however, that in the public sector, Namibia 
included, the independence of ACs is given less importance as public sector ACs may 
be composed of members who are not part of the SOE’s board, or they may be 
composed of alternate board members. This is in contrast to the private sector, where 
AC members are selected from the board (Armitage, 2011). However, as suggested in 
literature, there should be applicable regulations and legislation with clear definitions 
that can be used as guidance in establishing independence guidelines, and this should 
also apply to Namibia (NSX, 2014; Bromilow & Keller, 2011). These specific rules and 
guidelines, which can be translated into the AC charter, should set the minimum 
standard and should be readily available for consultation by directors serving on the AC. 
In the end, the ultimate goal is member independence in action, fact and appearance. 
 
Skills and experience 
 
Experience can be defined as knowledge or skills gained from doing something through 
practice or through observations of either events or facts (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015).  In 
the context of the ACs’ experience, it is the time spent working on assigned corporate 
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oversight responsibilities. Such experience is crucial as many oversight judgements are 
subjective (DeZoort, 1998). Experience can also be derived from the number of ACs on 
which a member has served and for how long (Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009). 
 
AC members should be appropriately skilled and experienced and there should be a 
basic level of qualification and experience set for members. This should include 
requirements such as having an understanding of corporate financial reporting, internal 
controls affecting finance, the workings of internal and external audit processes, 
company law, risk management, issues of sustainability, information technology, 
governance relating to integrated reporting and governance processes (NSX, 
2014:3.2:2.4-2.8). At individual level, each AC member should possess attributes such 
as strategic thinking, knowledge of financial language and ability to make decisions 
(Popescu et al., 2015). DeZoort (1998) asserts that AC members with experience, 
particularly in auditing, are better equipped to make judgements on internal controls, as 
those are similar to judgements made by auditors. Experienced AC members are also in 
a better position to challenge and question internal and external auditors’ findings 
(Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013). Furthermore, experienced AC members can easily reach 
consensus on complex issues and have better technical knowledge as opposed to 
members without experience (Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009).  
 
In overseeing the financial reporting process of a SOE and to assess financial 
information effectively, AC members should be conversant with the business of the 
SOE, its major operations and the industry in which it operates (Bricker & Fitts, 2017; 
Thibodeau & Packwood, 2008). AC members should have an understanding of how 
management and external auditors evaluate materiality as well as having their own 
views on the level of materiality (Thibodeau & Packwood, 2008). They should also be 
familiar with key accounting policies of the SOE and be able to determine whether these 
are reasonably, appropriately and consistently applied. In addition, AC members should 
understand the relevant accounting policies well enough to ask the correct questions of 
the auditors. This is because by asking the correct questions, AC members are able to 
demonstrate their competence to auditors, ensure that they are satisfied with the results 
of the audit and obtain assurance about the veracity of the audited financial statements 
(Thibodeau & Packwood, 2008). Fostering a culture of competency would greatly 
enhance the establishment of a strong AC in a SOE. Other important considerations are 
an understanding of which areas involve accounting estimates and how these impact on 
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the reported results as well as familiarity with the processes management uses to 
ensure that the financial statements capture all relevant data (Thibodeau & Packwood, 
2008).   
 
Naturally, AC members will individually have different personalities, which may influence 
their performance and the way in which they interpret information in carrying out their 
fiduciary duties (Redman, 2009). Thus Redman (2009) recommends that AC members 
should be divided into groups: i) those who are experienced, but who are busy in their 
career or personal life and thus want to spend the minimal amount of time required to 
fulfil their financial oversight responsibility, ii) those who are not knowledgeable about 
technical accounting or the financial environment but who have expertise in areas such 
as technology, risk management, specific industry, etc. that would be valuable to the 
AC, and iii) those who are knowledgeable and interested in detailed accounting and 
financial reporting. This grouping of AC members would determine how the content and 
layout of the information would be presented to the AC members; this would be the first 
step in improving the efficiency of the AC (Redman, 2009).  
 
The public sector ACs may not necessarily adopt the model and practices of the private 
sector ACs; they should nonetheless create ACs that meet their specific needs for 
providing independent review and oversight of the financial reporting process, internal 
controls and internal and external audit functions (Armitage, 2011).  
 
Financial experts and other experts 
 
According to the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.2:2.6) and as emphasised by Krishnamoorthy 
et al. (2002:57), it is necessary for AC members, individually and collectively, to have an 
understanding of International Financial Reporting Standards because of the AC’s 
responsibility to, among others, oversee financial reporting. According to Oshima (2005) 
and Bennie et al. (2015), at least one member of the AC should have accounting or 
financial management expertise and companies should disclose in their annual reports 
whether any member of the AC qualifies as an AC financial expert. In the same way, the 
NYSE and the NASD rules require all AC members to be financially literate while the UK 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance and the Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Council recommend for at least one member to have financial 
expertise (Deloitte, 2012). 
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Financial expertise is defined as past employment experience in finance or accounting, 
possessing a relevant professional certification in accounting or any other comparable 
experience or background, including experience in the role of CEO or a senior officer 
with financial oversight responsibilities (BRC, 1999:25). Badolato, Donelson and Ege 
(2014) define a financial expert as someone with experience in auditing activities or 
experience in using or creating financial reports. To meet the definition of a financial 
expert, according to Kintzele, Arndt, Kintzele and Kwiatkowski (2008), the AC member 
must have an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements as well as the ability to assess the application of such principles in 
connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves. In addition, the AC 
member should have experience in preparing, auditing, analysing or evaluating financial 
statements and should have an understanding of the internal controls and procedures 
for financial reporting (Kintzele et al., 2008). 
 
For the purpose of developing ACs’ financial expertise, Grenier, Balou and Philip (2012) 
recommend a certification programme for AC members designated as financial experts.  
Grenier et al. (2012: A20) assert that such a certification would yield the additional 
benefit of perceived confidence in the AC as well as providing updated information on 
current financial reporting issues and AC best practices. It would also send a strong 
signal to stakeholders that the AC members were in charge of the audit process.  
 
ACs with financial experts are better able to evaluate the financial statements, thereby 
improving the quality of financial reporting (Bennie et al., 2015; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 
2013). The presence of a financial expert on the AC can result in better scrutiny of 
internal controls and better working relations with internal and external auditors 
(Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013). Literature also suggests that the revenue of the company 
may improve because of financial experts serving on the AC (Bryan, Liu, Tiras & 
Zhuang, 2013). Other studies provide evidence of less fraud, less cases of financial 
restatements and an overall improved governance environment (Erkens & Bonner, 
2012). However, Badolato et al. (2014:226) report that the presence of a financial expert 
on the AC does not necessarily lead to lower cases of accounting irregularities without 
considering the skill, personal attributes and qualities of the individual. This is confirmed 
by Bennie et al. (2015) who suggest that having a financial expert, although important, 
  
37 
is by itself not adequate and much depends on other factors contributing to the 
effectiveness of the AC. 
 
Financial reporting is often associated with litigation risk. Krishnan et al. (2011) found 
that directors with legal backgrounds who serve on ACs contribute positively to financial 
reporting quality because their legal knowledge alerts them to potential legal liability 
threats. This, however, does not necessarily mean that directors with legal backgrounds 
have any financial expertise. Krishnan et al. (2011) found that legal and accounting 
expertise appear to play balancing roles in monitoring financial reporting and may make 
a positive contribution to the financial reporting quality. 
 
2.10.3 Managing audit committee activities 
 
For the AC of the SOE to be able to manage its activities effectively, it needs the 
appropriate chairperson to drive the AC’s business agenda, the necessary resources to 
manage relationships with key stakeholders, effective meetings and training and 
development of the AC members. 
 
Chairperson 
 
The AC of a SOE requires an experienced chairperson with strong leadership skills, 
good facilitation skills and the ability to foster and promote effective working 
relationships among the AC members to drive the committee’s activities (Popescu et al., 
2015; Leblanc, 2007). Literature suggests that knowledgeable and experienced AC 
chairpersons are more likely to seek information from the internal audit function and 
CAEs are more likely to pursue informal interactions with such chairpersons (Zaman & 
Sarens, 2013). Therefore, a comprehensive position description or equivalent should 
exist for AC chairpersons, tailored to individual SOE and industrial circumstances, which 
may be used as a basis for recruitment, succession planning, assessment and 
remuneration of future AC chairpersons (Leblanc, 2007).  
 
The AC chairperson should, among others, understand the major financial reporting 
issues to direct the AC’s focus to high-risk areas, which suggests that the chair should 
have financial expertise. In fact, the background of the AC chairperson and how they 
are perceived by those engaged in governance within the SOE, including senior 
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management, influence financial reporting, risk management and control outcomes 
(Bruynseels, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2015; Turley & Zaman, 2007). In addition, 
Bruynseels et al. (2015) observe that a chairperson of the AC who is a financial expert 
can lead to lower audit fees and lower internal control deficiencies and weaknesses. 
 
The chairperson is at the helm of the AC, plays a leadership role and drives the 
activities of AC meetings. This involves setting the tone and encouraging every AC 
member’s full participation (Bruynseels et al., 2015; Deloitte, 2012). However, the ability 
of the AC to effectively carry out its oversight function may be impeded if the 
chairperson has too many responsibilities (Tanyi & Smith, 2015), for example, if the 
chairperson has many other directorships. 
 
Resources 
 
The AC should have enough resources at its disposal to fulfil its oversight duties 
(Alleyne et al., 2006:570). ACs require adequate and ongoing administrative assistance 
from management to be able to schedule meetings, formulate meeting agendas, 
compile and distribute meeting packs before meetings, draft minutes and coordinate 
responses to the questions that come up in meetings (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). It has 
become standard practice for the AC to depend on either the company secretary, the 
finance department, internal audit or a combination of the finance department and 
internal audit, to provide such assistance (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). 
 
From an efficiency point of view, the AC is expected to possess the necessary skills to 
carry out its duties. Nonetheless, the AC should be able to operate within its power and 
occasionally engage additional resources in exceptional circumstances. Such power 
may include hiring an independent advisor at the expense of the company (Bromilow & 
Keller, 2011). However, such authority should be specified in the AC charter to avoid 
ambiguity.  
 
Relationships  
 
The SOE’s AC needs to maintain a smooth relationship with management because 
management is an important source of information for the AC. The AC should foster a 
positive working relationship which encourages managers to be honest, candid, 
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transparent, responsive and supportive of the activities of the AC (Leblanc, 2007). 
Friction between the AC and senior management may result in fear, distrust and lack of 
participation, to the detriment of both the AC and the SOE as a whole (Leblanc, 2007). 
 
The AC should consider its attitude and approach towards internal audit because 
appreciating the functions and responsibilities of internal audit could strengthen the 
internal audit function and make the internal audit function an important resource to the 
AC in fulfilling its responsibilities (Turley & Zaman, 2004). Beasley et al. (2009) provide 
evidence of ACs relying on external auditors for input. This is necessary because some 
of the information needed to carry out the duties of the AC, especially when evaluating 
systems and processes or when benchmarking, requires input from the external auditor.  
 
From the discussion above, it seems inefficient for the AC to perform its oversight duties 
without having reliance on management and the internal and external auditors’ support 
(Beasley et al., 2009). Therefore, the AC needs to effectively manage the relationship 
with both management and with internal and external auditors. However, the 
management of relationships should not compromise the AC’s independence. Beasley 
et al. (2009) found that AC members at times became lax, relying on the support of 
management and internal and external auditors, such that the role of the AC became 
ceremonial or rubber stamping. 
 
Meetings 
 
Meetings provide an opportunity for the AC to delve deeper into complex areas of the 
SOE while interacting with managers and the auditors (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). 
Although phone meetings and video conferencing are increasingly becoming methods 
of conducting meetings, formal face-to-face meetings remain an important means for 
the AC to carry out its responsibilities (Bromilow & Keller, 2011).  
 
The responsibilities of ACs vary from entity to entity and are often very complex, hence 
it is not surprising that an AC meets frequently (Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009). 
The AC should meet as many times as necessary to perform its functions, and enough 
time should be allocated for these meetings (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). The IIA (2014) 
suggests that the AC should meet at least four times a year, with meetings scheduled 
alongside board meetings, seeing that the AC members are also members of the board. 
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The important fact remains that the AC should have the authority to call additional 
meetings as circumstances require (IIA, 2014).  
 
The AC should establish a meeting calendar well in advance as this will assist it to 
address all its responsibilities over the course of a year (Popescu et al., 2015). In 
addition, such a calendar should spread the committee’s responsibilities across 
meetings and should incorporate additional activities such as educational sessions 
(Bromilow & Keller, 2011). The meeting calendar should include, among others, the 
AC’s private sessions with the internal and external auditors, topics for discussion by 
the AC members with time allocated to each topic, presentations by the company 
executives and provision for special meetings (Popescu et al., 2015:57-68). 
 
To aid the AC’s effectiveness, members should receive detailed written agendas along 
with briefing materials ahead of each meeting, preferably a week in advance (Bromilow 
& Keller, 2011). This allows the AC members to carefully study the materials, in 
preparation for the meeting (Beasley et al., 2009). In this regard, the AC members, 
particularly the chairperson, should ensure that all important issues are covered in the 
agenda and that the agendas are structured according to the AC’s satisfaction 
(Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Beasley et al. (2009) suggest, however, that when 
management takes control of the AC agenda, there is a risk that the AC may not get the 
right information to fulfil its responsibilities. 
 
It is important that AC members have enough time to discuss important matters and 
although different factors may influence what may be considered a standard or 
minimum meeting length, the deciding factor should be whether the AC members are 
satisfied that they have properly addressed significant agenda items without pressure of 
having to rush discussions (Deloitte, 2012). For meetings to be efficient, AC members 
are expected to review the briefing materials well in advance of each meeting, as this 
will minimise formal presentations during meetings and can allow AC members to spend 
time discussing relevant issues (Deloitte, 2012). 
  
The chief financial officer (CFO), the CAE, external auditors and company secretary 
should attend AC meetings when required. However, to maximise effectiveness and 
support an atmosphere that allows for honest discussions of sensitive matters, the AC 
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should limit attendance of meetings to those that can make meaningful contributions to 
the agenda topics (Deloitte, 2012). 
 
Minutes reflect how the AC discharges its assigned responsibilities. Apart from the 
minutes, which only reflect the topic covered, other important information such as the 
total time spent in the meeting, who was present and the conclusions reached, should 
also be recorded (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Minutes should include action sheets 
detailing the title of the discussion, planned action to be taken, responsible person and 
the deadline (United Kingdom, 2011). Action sheets also make provision to report on 
the progress of outstanding issues. Moreover, the AC minutes should reflect the 
process the AC used to discuss or resolve issues and relevant information taken into 
consideration in arriving at each decision. The AC minutes should provide sufficient 
information for members to draw from should questions arise later. Furthermore, the 
minutes should be drafted by the secretary appointed to the AC, although studies 
indicate that minutes should preferably be drafted by company lawyers, who understand 
the implications involved in capturing details (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). The use of 
lawyers may, however, not be necessary if the minutes truly reflect what transpired 
during the meeting.  
 
Training and development  
 
AC members should be taken through suitable orientation and regular training if they 
are to perform well in their oversight role (Deloitte, 2012). Although AC members are 
expected to have technical knowledge before being appointed, this knowledge should 
be further developed through ongoing training. This places AC members in a better 
position to comprehend what is expected of them and to carry out their responsibilities 
effectively (Deloitte, 2012).  
 
There should be orientation programmes in place for new AC members to have a clear 
picture of the AC’s roles and responsibilities (Popescu et al., 2015). New AC members 
should become familiarised with the control processes and related risks affecting the 
financial reporting of the SOE before starting with the AC activities (Deloitte, 2012). 
Similarly, according to Leblanc (2007), the orientation programmes for new AC 
members should be comprehensive, formal, tailor-made and suit the environment and 
industry in which the SOE operates. The orientation programme may cover, among 
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others, topics about financial reporting, areas where a high degree of judgement may be 
required and understanding of internal control over financial reporting (Popescu et al., 
2015). The orientation programme may also include other topics of importance such as 
compliance requirements, legal issues, whistle blowing, self-review by AC members and 
the AC charter review process (Popescu et al., 2015; Bromilow & Keller, 2011).  
 
Continuous training programmes such as understanding the impact of changes in 
accounting and regulatory developments allow AC members to stay abreast of major 
changes that could affect the SOE either directly or indirectly, as it may impact on the 
environment in which the SOE operates (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Ongoing training 
may also include i) regular seminars and refresher workshops to update AC members 
on the latest developments in finance, ii) understanding, assessing and interpreting the 
SOE’s financial statements, iii) briefings on integral support services such as the 
importance of information technology and risk management and how these affect 
financial reporting and iv) updates on governance codes and best practices (Bromilow & 
Keller, 2011). 
 
Finally, AC members can make use of training developed in-house or facilitated by 
external consultants. They can also attend conferences tailor-made for directors, where 
directors and leading authorities share practical experience and understanding of 
issues. Lastly, they can also benefit from training offered by auditing firms (Bromilow & 
Keller, 2011).  
 
2.10.4 Performance assessment 
 
Constant assessment of the AC is necessary as it establishes whether or not the AC is 
meeting its oversight responsibilities and is adding value to the SOE (Bennie et al., 
2015). To improve performance and effectiveness, the NamCode thus specifically 
requires that board committees, including ACs, be evaluated every year (NSX, 
2014:2.22). However, no guidance is provided in literature on the criteria to evaluate the 
performance of ACs and their members (Bennie et al., 2015). Bennie et al. (2015) also 
note that where performance assessments of ACs and AC members do exist, they are 
used infrequently and are ineffective.   
 
  
43 
The AC of a SOE can evaluate its performance by comparing the AC’s activities against 
the AC charter, which will confirm whether or not the AC has fulfilled its responsibilities 
during the year (Popescu et al., 2015). Evaluation can also be done by comparing the 
AC’s activities against known leading practices as this will help the AC to understand 
alternative and more efficient approaches to carry out the AC’s oversight responsibilities 
(Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Evaluation can also be done through the AC evaluating itself 
(Deloitte, 2013). This method can be accomplished through discussions with AC 
members of other SOEs. Discussing the AC’s performance among AC members allows 
each member to give their view on what worked well in the committee and what could 
improve (KPMG, 2008). The AC can also have a discussion with management and 
others who interact with it on a regular basis, such as the internal and external auditors. 
This will assist the AC to obtain views on its performance and insight into issues to 
which the AC should give attention (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). 
 
The AC may assess the performance of individual AC members, which can be 
facilitated by the chairperson (IIA, 2014). The assessment could focus on the member’s 
meeting attendance, understanding of the SOE’s objectives and activities or whether or 
not the member demonstrates an understanding of the responsibilities of the AC (IIA, 
2014). The assessment may also focus on the member’s professional contribution, 
conduct, preparation for meetings, suggestions of practical solutions, giving constructive 
criticism and interaction at AC meetings (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Furthermore, the AC 
member can be assessed on their suggestions for new ideas as opposed to accepting 
the status quo (IIA, 2014). The AC member’s willingness to devote the time necessary 
to prepare for and participate in the committee’s deliberations and meeting attendance 
must also be assessed (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). The most challenging assessment is 
the assessment of the independence and objectivity of the AC member (Bromilow & 
Keller, 2011) because these qualities are difficult to judge. 
 
Ongoing AC evaluation is important, however, irrespective of the method used, whether 
formal or informal, the objective should be to improve the AC’s effectiveness (KPMG, 
2008). Accordingly, the evaluations should focus not only on what the AC does but also 
on how effectively it conducts its activities and the extent to which it is following best 
practice (Bromilow & Keller, 2011; Magrane & Malthus, 2010).  
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2.10.5 Reporting 
 
It is good practice for the AC to annually report on how it carried out its duties 
(Armitage, 2011). In some countries, Namibia included, such reporting requirements are 
set down in governance codes or regulations (Armitage, 2011). The AC is required to 
report internally to the board as well as to shareholders at the annual general meeting. 
This report is generally included in the annual report of the SOE (NSX, 2014:3.10).  
 
The AC report should typically start with a brief description of the role and 
responsibilities of the AC as well as a declaration as to whether or not the AC has 
adopted an AC charter approved by the board (NSX, 2014:3.10). The report should 
include a description of how the AC carried out its duties in accordance with the charter 
and also provide information on the independence of the AC (NSX, 2014:3.10:10.3.3). 
In addition, the report should include the following: i) demonstrate the AC’s satisfaction 
that the external auditor was independent of the company, ii) indicate whether there is 
an internal audit charter approved by the board, iii) confirm whether the company 
complied with its legal, regulatory or other responsibilities and iv) state whether or not 
the AC recommended the annual report to the board for approval (NSX, 2014:3.10; 
Bromilow & Keller, 2011). Moreover, the AC should include comments that it reviewed 
the appropriateness of the financial statements, the accounting practices and the 
internal financial control of the SOE (NSX, 2014:3.10:10.2.3). Also vital is the inclusion 
of the names and qualifications of all members of the AC during the period under 
review, and the period for which they have served on the committee (NSX, 
2014:3.10:10.3.3). The number of AC meetings held during the period under review and 
attendance of these meetings should also be included in the AC report (NSX, 
2014:3.10). 
 
2.11 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter demonstrated how an AC forms part of the broader corporate governance 
structure which enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the board as well as 
assisting the board to fulfil its oversight responsibilities. The use of an AC may result in 
certain benefits that accrue to the SOE if the AC functions effectively. The AC should 
have the appropriate mandate from which to draw authority. The appointment of AC 
members should be handled by a nomination committee. Specifically, the CEO’s 
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involvement in selecting board members who are subsequently appointed to the AC 
may curb the AC’s independence and in turn, reduce its effectiveness. Three and not 
more than six AC members is the appropriate size for the AC as six members is 
manageable. Independence in particular is regarded as essential to the success of ACs 
and members should exhibit independence of mind and appearance. Other important 
characteristics under composition are the skills and experience of AC members as well 
as expertise in the area of finance. The activities of the AC should be properly managed 
which requires a strong AC chairperson to drive the agenda of the AC. This includes the 
resources at the disposal of the AC to effectively carry out its duties, its relationships 
with stakeholders, the quality and frequency of meetings and the training and 
development of members. There should be performance assessments to evaluate both 
the AC’s and its members’ contribution to the activities of the AC and also to evaluate 
whether the AC is meeting its oversight objectives. Lastly, the AC has an obligation to 
report to shareholders and stakeholders on its activities. 
 
In conclusion, for a SOE’s AC to be effective, the committee should first and foremost 
comply with the established AC charter, secondly members should actively participate 
in the activities of the AC and thirdly, the AC should be viewed as adding value to the 
SOE. 
 
The next chapter will cover the research methodology adopted in this study to obtain 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SOEs’ ACs to provide sound corporate 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review was carried out, describing the 
historical development of ACs and establishing how they fit into the corporate 
governance framework. The review also identified the benefits of an effective AC, the 
changing expectations of ACs as well as factors that influence the effectiveness of ACs. 
This was necessary to set the theoretical framework against which the empirical 
findings will be assessed and thus inform the questions posed to the various 
participants.   
 
In Namibia, although most SOEs have ACs, the problems evident in some SOEs call 
into question the effectiveness of these ACs as part of the governance processes. The 
primary research question of this study is which factors affect the effectiveness of ACs 
at selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. In order to answer 
this question, this study employed a qualitative research design to identify the factors 
that contribute to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs. 
 
This chapter will discuss the research methodology used in this study, outlining the 
research approach, research design, selection of cases and participants, data 
collection, data analysis, trustworthiness and the ethical considerations.   
 
3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
In order to achieve the research objective, a qualitative research approach was adopted 
to examine the current state of affairs of ACs in Namibia’s SOEs. A qualitative approach 
was deemed suitable because it seeks answers that explain how, why and in what way 
things happen in the way they do (Hancock, 2002). Qualitative research gives the 
researcher the freedom to explore perspectives, experiences, qualities and complexities 
of ACs and give them meaning (Ryan et al., 2002:43). Qualitative research is a well-
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established method which has been extensively tried and tested in similar cases 
(Shenton, 2004). 
  
The qualitative researcher does the following (Hancock, 2002): i) seeks out the 
opinions, experiences and feelings of participants, ii) narrates the situation as it occurs 
in real life without manipulation, iii) approaches the whole situation holistically, iv) 
collects information intended for future social development, v) develops future concepts 
and theories and vi) does not attempt to manipulate the situation under consideration.  
 
Another possible approach that could have been considered is quantitative research. 
This type of research is concerned with finding answers to questions that are quantified 
in frequency, timing, value, weight, etc (Hancock, 2002). Quantitative research seeks to 
statistically generalise the outcome of the research to the broader population 
(Baskarada, 2014). A quantitative design would not have been appropriate to examine 
and explore the complexities of ACs or to answer the questions of how, why and in what 
way things operate in ACs.   
 
There are no standardised models on how ACs are expected to operate which makes 
ACs a complex phenomenon. Comparing the ACs of poorly performing SOEs with those 
of successful SOEs could have warranted the use of a quantitative approach, however, 
the characteristics and practices of ACs vary and are often influenced by distinct 
business, regulatory, cultural and marketplace factors. As a result, direct comparison 
would have been difficult (Hancock, 2002). Therefore, a qualitative design was 
considered most appropriate. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
There are different types of qualitative designs which can be followed. Ethnography 
research explores culture holistically, with the researcher being a participant observer 
(Salkind, 2013:46). Historical research involves collecting, organising and summarising 
historical data to draw conclusions about what might have really happened (Salkind, 
2013:46). Case study research focuses on capturing human behaviour by examining a 
person or a thing (Salkind, 2013:46). Grounded theory research focuses on the 
collection and analysis of data to develop new theories (Hancock, 2002). 
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The current study followed a descriptive case study design. This type of design is used 
to “describe an intervention or phenomenon and the real life context in which it 
occurred” (Baxter & Jack, 2008:544). Furthermore, a case study design is suitable when 
describing a component that is made up of one unit, for example the AC (Hancock, 
2002). In this regard, the researcher used a case study approach to gather in-depth 
information about the specific unit of analysis. Hence, by capturing as much information 
as possible about a single unit observed at a single point in time, the researcher is in a 
much better position to map out the situation and obtain a broader understanding of the 
entire population (Baskarada, 2014).    
 
In the context of the current study, the purpose was to identify the factors contributing to 
the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate 
governance. The researcher covered the contextual conditions applicable to the ACs 
and the case study provided insights into the nature of ACs based on their existing 
practices (Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
The use of case studies has been criticised as being subjective, with researchers at 
times failing to justify the reason behind the selection of a particular case (Dube & Pare, 
2003). However, case studies are chosen because of the unique situations they present 
in bringing together various sets of circumstances that form an entire picture (Hancock, 
2002). One way of justifying the use of case studies according to Yin (2004) is to make 
sure that the research is reliable. Reliability in case study research is achieved by 
including a study protocol for use by other researchers to arrive at similar results using 
the same data collection procedures (Hancock, 2002). A study protocol includes an 
overview of the research, field procedures, guiding questions and report outline.     
 
3.4 SELECTION OF CASES AND PARTICIPANTS 
 
Collecting data through a qualitative approach is time-consuming and often involves 
one-on-one interaction with interviewees to obtain detailed information on a 
phenomenon without generalising the results. This therefore justifies using smaller 
samples (Hancock, 2002). Smaller samples allow the researcher to conduct an in-depth 
study, explore and obtain rich information, thereby gaining penetrating insights into a 
phenomenon (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). While the samples for quantitative 
research are selected statistically at random using probability techniques, the qualitative 
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sampling approach is based on subjective judgement. It is a non-probability sampling 
method which does not specify the possibility that any case will be included in the 
sample (Saunders et al., 2009). The use of subjective judgement in qualitative sampling 
is influenced by the relationship between the objective and the focus of the research as 
well as the technique used to sample (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
There were 98 SOEs in Namibia at the time of selecting the research sites (cases) 
(Namibia, 2016). Three of these were selected as cases for the study. The selection 
was purposive, targeting a homogeneous sub-group of SOEs in order to understand the 
phenomenon of ACs (Patton, 2015). Because of the in-depth nature of the study and 
the analysis of data required, a small, selective sample of three SOEs was considered 
to be the most appropriate to yield rich data and reach data saturation (Cormack, 2000). 
Furthermore, the results were not intended to be generalised and the focus was more 
on the specific ACs’ characteristics and not on those of the entire population (Saunders 
et al., 2009).  
 
Purposive sampling is described as the selection of sampling units within the segment 
of the population with the most information on the characteristic of interest (Guarte & 
Barrios, 2006). Although random sampling, as used in quantitative research, would 
have been appropriate in nullifying any possibility of the researcher’s bias, the use of 
purposive sampling minimises the possibility of choosing participants who would not be 
cooperative and there is also no need for the participants to be representative of the 
population in the study (Shenton, 2004). 
 
The criteria used to select the SOEs are as follows: 
 
• Accessibility – The SOE had to be accessible (Creswell, 2007) 
• AC – To be eligible for the study the SOE had to have an AC (Patton, 2001:238). 
 
From the three selected SOEs, three participants were selected per SOE, namely, the 
chairperson of the AC, the CAE and the CFO. However, a human resource executive of 
one of the SOEs was also selected because they were in charge of the internal audit 
function and attended the AC meetings. The chairpersons of the ACs were selected 
because they are in charge of the ACs and would have had insight and first-hand 
information about the ACs. They could also arrange for the researcher to have access 
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to information needed for this study. The CAEs and CFOs were selected because of 
their regular interactions with the ACs. These are people who hold positions of trust 
within the ranks of the SOEs and are experienced professionals. Therefore, it was 
highly anticipated that they would be candid and act with diligence and due care when 
approached to participate in the interviews.  
 
Participants are more likely to agree to participate in interviews as opposed to 
completing questionnaires because interviews provide participants with the opportunity 
to reflect on issues without writing them down (Saunders et al., 2009). Participants feel 
more confident and act more openly when sharing confidential information in person, 
during interviews, as opposed to sharing information with someone they have never met 
through the completion of questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2009). Three participants 
from each SOE were considered appropriate so that individual experiences and points 
of view could be verified against other participants in order to construct a clear picture of 
the research topic (Shenton, 2004).   
 
A letter was sent to the Ministry of Public Enterprises in Namibia, requesting permission 
to approach the SOEs (see Annexure A). After permission was granted, each selected 
SOE was requested in writing, through the office of the CEO, to provide contact details 
such as telephone numbers and email addresses of individuals selected for interviews 
(see Annexure B). CEOs were particularly requested to avail themselves to provide 
information that may be required for the purposes of the study or to avail anyone at the 
SOE who could be of assistance. 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION  
 
Various data collection techniques can be employed in sourcing information in 
qualitative case study research (Shenton, 2004). These techniques include document 
reviews, interviews, archival records, physical artefacts, observation and focus group 
discussions (Salkind, 2012). For the purpose of this study, three data collection 
techniques were used, namely, i) annual report reviews, ii) individual interviews with the 
chairpersons of ACs, CAEs and CFOs and iii) field notes. 
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3.5.1 Document reviews 
 
The first data collection technique consisted of examining documentation which was 
created by the selected SOEs and made available to the public. The documents in 
question were the annual reports of the selected SOEs which were downloaded from 
the SOEs’ websites. Where an annual report could not be found on the website, it was 
requested from the specific SOE. The review of documentation allowed the researcher 
to familiarise himself with the SOEs before engaging with the participants (Shenton, 
2004). This was necessary because documentation provided valuable information which 
could be used to confirm information gathered through interviews (Salkind, 2012). The 
guiding questions used in the review of the annual reports are provided in Annexure C. 
 
The documentation review covered the following areas: 
 
• Question 1 recorded the name of the chairperson of the board. 
• Questions 2 and 3 recorded the disclosure of the SOE’s audit committee in the 
annual report and the members of the audit committee. 
• Question 4 recorded the existence of a financial expert among the members of 
the audit committee. 
• Questions 5 to 7 recorded the positions of the audit committee members, their 
qualifications and experience. 
• Question 8 recorded the existence of an audit committee charter. 
• Questions 9 to 10 recorded the activities performed by the audit committee 
during the year as well as the frequency of meetings. 
 
3.5.2 Interviews  
 
The second data collection technique consisted of interviews with the chairpersons of 
the ACs as well as the CFOs and CAEs of the SOEs. Interviews are described as 
guided conversations and interactions between the interviewer and the interviewee and 
are suitable if the interviewer seeks information which may be difficult to obtain 
(Baskarada, 2014). Interviews were considered most appropriate for the study because 
of the numerous questions that needed to be asked, some of which were complex and 
had to be asked in various ways and in varying order (Saunders et al., 2009).  
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The interviews were semi-structured and consisted of the interviewer asking the 
participants questions to cover issues that the researcher wanted to be sure of 
addressing (Hancock, 2002). Semi-structured interviews were considered appropriate 
as opposed to more structured or unstructured interviews as this form enabled the 
interviewer to explore the phenomenon under investigation in depth while maintaining 
comparable data on the participants’ views. Semi-structured interviews also allowed the 
interviewer to ask open-ended questions while giving the participant the opportunity to 
explain an issue in detail (Salkind, 2012). Semi-structured interviews also allowed the 
interviewer to ask probing questions and request interviewees to expand on their 
answers (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Structured interviews, on the other hand, involve the use of standardised questions and 
are thus more suitable for collecting quantitative data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Unstructured interviews do not use predetermined questions, are more informal and 
require the interviewer to have a clear knowledge of the subject being researched 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
In this study, guiding questions were prepared based on the theoretical framework of 
the factors influencing the effectiveness of ACs (refer to section 2.10 in Chapter 2). To 
encourage participation and the easy flow of information, the interviews were started 
with conversations to relax the interviewees and put them at ease. These conversations 
included explaining the importance of the research topic and informing the interviewee 
of their right to answer or not answer questions. This included the right to withdraw from 
the interview. The interviewees were also informed that the sessions would be 
recorded. It was also clearly explained that there were no right or wrong answers to the 
questions. This was necessary to help establish rapport between the interviewer and 
interviewee, as suggested by Salkind (2012).  
 
Furthermore, to avoid misinterpretation or misunderstanding, the interviewer avoided 
interjecting while the interviewee was talking and also avoided leading the interviewee 
to provide influenced and biased answers (Baskarada, 2014). Instead, the interviewer 
accepted what the interviewee said as the participant’s views and perspectives. The 
interviewer steered away from ‘why?’ questions, which had the potential to make the 
interviewee defensive or biased (Baskarada, 2014).  
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To avoid distraction during the interviews by taking notes and posing questions at the 
same time, the interviews were digitally recorded. Taking notes during interviews 
increases the risk that the interviewer will most likely write down only notes that make 
immediate sense (Hancock, 2002). By recording the interviews, the interviewer was 
able to tentatively listen and respond to the interviewee (Hancock, 2002). The recording 
also made it possible to produce a full transcript as the entire interview was captured 
and a complete set of data was available for analysis (Baskarada, 2014). Interviewees’ 
permission to record the conversations was, however, sought before each interview was 
recorded.  
 
To add credibility to the interviews, the interviewer carefully prepared for each interview 
by familiarising himself with the SOE, as recommended by Saunders et al. (2009). In 
this regard, the interviewer drew information about the selected SOEs from the 
document reviews. This allowed the interviewer to demonstrate credibility and to assess 
the relevance and accuracy of answers. It also allowed the interviewer to provide 
accurate and relevant information to interviewees before commencing with interviews 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
The interviews took place on the premises of each SOE. This setting was considered to 
be the most convenient environment, allowing the interviewees to feel comfortable when 
answering questions. The questions were designed to simplify conversation with 
interviewees and to ensure the interviews were completed within the shortest possible 
time. Each interview lasted on average 40 to 60 minutes and the length of time was 
influenced by the responses provided by the interviewees.  
 
The guiding questions for the chairpersons of the ACs covered the following areas (see 
Annexure D): 
 
• Question 1 recorded the experience of the chairperson of the audit committee. 
• Question 2 recorded the existence of a formal approved AC charter as well as 
the existence of a work plan. 
• Questions 3 to 4 recorded the nomination of members to serve on the AC and 
the composition of the AC. 
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• Question 5 recorded the previous skills and experience of the AC members, the 
existence of an AC member designated as a finance expert and the experience 
of AC members in finance and auditing. 
• Question 6 recorded the management of the activities of the AC. 
• Question 7 recorded the training and development of the AC. 
• Question 8 recorded the performance assessment of the AC. 
• Question 9 recorded the general awareness of the AC members of issues 
concerning governance.  
 
The guiding questions for the CFOs covered the following areas (see Annexure E): 
 
• Question 1 recorded the reporting relationship of the finance department with the 
AC. 
• Questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 recorded the involvement of the AC in the internal 
control, maintenance of the integrity of financial reporting, accounting policies 
and accounting processes of the SOE. 
• Question 6 recorded the involvement of the AC in the review of the legal and 
regulatory environment of the SOE. 
• Question 7 recorded the extent of involvement of the finance department in the 
activities of the AC.  
• Question 8 recorded the contribution of the finance department to the training 
and development of the AC members. 
• Question 9 recorded the expectations of the AC from the CFO with regard to the 
meetings of the AC. 
• Question 10 recorded the general opinion of the CFO about the AC’s 
understanding of the International Financial Reporting Standards. 
• Questions 11 and 12 recorded the budget and the opinion of the CFO on the AC 
members’ understanding of their role.  
 
The guiding questions for the CAEs covered the following areas (see Annexure F): 
 
• Question 1 recorded the reporting structure of the internal audit function in 
relation to the AC. 
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• Questions 2 and 3 covered the involvement of the AC in the staffing of the 
internal audit function as well the appointment of the head of the internal audit 
function. 
• Questions 4 and 5 covered the role of the AC in the charter, plans and 
compliance of the internal audit function with the internal audit standards. 
• Questions 6 and 7 recorded the extent of involvement of the internal audit 
function in the activities of the AC and the training and development of the AC 
members.  
• Question 8 recorded the expectations of the AC from the CAE with regard to the 
meetings of the AC. 
• Questions 9 and 10 recorded the frequency of meetings of the internal audit 
function with the AC. 
• Question 11 recorded the relationship between the AC and the internal audit 
function. 
• Question 12 recorded the general opinion of the CAE about the functions of the 
AC. 
 
An information sheet describing areas to be addressed during the interviews was e-
mailed to the participants before the interviews (see Annexure G). This was considered 
necessary so that the participants would have an idea of what to expect during the 
interviews. The information did not include the interview questions, however, to avoid 
rehearsed answers.  
 
3.5.3 Field notes 
 
Field notes provide a record of observations or conversations taken during the 
qualitative research (Thorpe & Holt, 2008). Field notes were written up in conjunction 
with document reviews after the interviews. Immediately after each interview, the 
researcher recorded the name of the SOE, where the interview took place, the interview 
setting, background information about the interviewee and the overall impression of the 
interview (Robson, 2002). 
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3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of data analysis is to systematically put the data in order, come up with a 
structure and extract meaning from information gathered (Polit & Beck, 2008). Data 
analysis involves scrutinising, classifying, arranging and analysing the qualitative 
evidence to address the research objective (Kohlbacher, 2005). Particularly in 
qualitative case studies, the qualitative data analysis process should enable the 
researcher to draw empirically based conclusions from the evidence that was gathered 
(Baskarada, 2014). Qualitative data refer to data that is not quantified or not numeric. It 
ranges from data collected from interviews to data collected through questionnaires 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The idea of qualitative data analysis is to discover the bigger 
picture through the use of conceptualisation (Saunders et al., 2009). Data collection and 
data analysis are highly interactive and enable the researcher to identify themes and 
patterns (Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
Ongoing data analysis was conducted throughout the study using an inductive 
approach. This type of approach involves the researcher proposing theories based on 
the data and then relating these to literature (Saunders et al., 2009). The idea is to let 
the data lead to the emergence of concepts (Saunders et al., 2009).  Data collected 
through the document reviews was mainly used to verify the data generated through the 
interviews.  
 
The researcher familiarised himself with the data by listening to the interview recordings 
and reading the field notes in order to list key ideas (Pope et al., 2000). The recordings 
were then given to a transcriber to reproduce a written account of the actual words 
spoken during the interviews (Saunders et al., 2009). The use of a professional 
transcriber was necessary because the process of transcribing is time-consuming and 
requires not only transcribing what was actually said by the interviewees, but also the 
way it was said and the tone used. In addition, the use of a transcriber improves the 
reliability of the data, because it is done by an independent and impartial person.  
 
After the transcription process was completed, the researcher read through all the 
transcripts to get a sense of the data (Creswell, 2003). Each transcript was then saved 
as a separate file and given a name to protect the identity of the interviewees (Saunders 
et al., 2009). The transcribed data were then carefully summarised, organised and 
  
57 
categorised into different themes. This was done in order to establish and identify a 
pattern which was interpreted in accordance with the social settings in which the ACs 
functioned (Kohlbacher, 2005). During the process of summarising and organising the 
transcribed data, the researcher coded the data. This was done by reading the text 
several times over and highlighting key segments. These were assigned a code word or 
phrase that best described the meaning of the segment, which was most relevant to the 
research objective and question. The researcher kept track of the study objective while 
assigning codes as per the suggestion of Creswell (2003). During the process of 
assigning codes, codes that were similar were linked to each other and grouped to form 
categories. The categories were then reviewed and converged into themes, provided 
that there was sufficient data to support them. 
  
To assist with the coding and analysis of data, Computer Assisted Quality Data Analysis 
(CAQDAS) was used. The use of CAQDAS offers various analytical procedural 
advantages, for example, it aids transparency, ensures continuity and enhances 
methodological rigour (Saunders et al., 2009).  
  
3.7 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
All findings and results were based on data collected through document analysis, 
interviews and field notes. The researcher adopted the principle that quality in 
qualitative research cannot be guaranteed through the careful application of 
predetermined procedures and strategies (Rolfe, 2004). Quality is revealed by the 
researcher in the writing-up of this report, therefore, qualitative research calls for the 
prudent decision and keen attention of the reader to appraise the quality of the report 
(Rolfe, 2004).  
 
Rigour was ensured in the study by leaving an audit trail. To enhance the robustness of 
the study, as suggested by Guba (1981), the research included naturalistic elements 
insofar as it took place in a real-world setting, without attempts by the researcher to 
manipulate the phenomenon (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 1999). One such criterion is 
ensuring the credibility of the study – this refers to the congruence of the findings with 
reality.  
 
  
58 
Credibility was achieved by following the recommendations of Guba (1981) by i) 
adopting well-established research methods in qualitative research, ii) becoming familiar 
with the participating organisations before engaging the participants in interviews, iii) 
using an appropriate sampling method to increase confidence that the selected 
participants were part of the wider population, iv) triangulating data from the interviews 
with field notes and relevant SOEs documents, v) giving the participants the right to 
refuse participation in the interviews and vi) emphasising the independence of the 
researcher, thereby increasing the likelihood of honest responses by participants.  
 
Another criterion taken into consideration was transferability. This refers to the 
researcher relating the study observations to similar situations (Guba, 1981). The 
researcher also incorporated the criterion of dependability by describing the process of 
undertaking this study in detail, so that future researchers could arrive at similar results 
if they were to repeat the work (Guba, 1981). Finally, the researcher was also 
concerned about the confirmability of the findings and took care to remain objective and 
to ensure that the results were a true representation of what actually transpired during 
the interviews, without researcher bias (Guba, 1981).  
 
3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Objectivity was maintained during the analysis of the results to ensure that the data was 
not misinterpreted. This was extended to the reporting stage to avoid distortion of 
conclusions and recommendations (Saunders et al., 2009). The privacy and 
confidentiality of the participants were maintained at all times to avoid harming the 
participants in any way (Saunders et al., 2009). The participants’ anonymity was 
guaranteed and no personal or identifiable information was recorded in the study. All 
participants’ experiences and perceptions are portrayed as stated during the interviews, 
no false information was included. The findings of one SOE were not compared against 
another SOE. After transcription, the data was stored in password-protected folders on 
an external hard drive to which only the researcher had access. 
 
Participation in the study was voluntary. In this regard, a consent form was emailed to 
each participant requesting them to sign it (see Annexure H). The participants were 
informed that they could choose to withdraw from the study at any time. However, to 
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avoid participants from withdrawing, the researcher explained the importance of the 
research and how the results would be utilised.  
 
As suggested by Kelly and Simpson (2001), regular contact was maintained throughout 
the research process with the participants out of concern that some may change their 
minds and decide not to participate. Prior approval from the Research Ethics Review 
Committee of the College of Accounting Sciences at UNISA aided in securing the 
participation of the interviewees.  
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discussed the ‘road map’ adopted to execute the empirical component of 
the study. Firstly, it discussed the research approach and the research design, 
emphasising the reason for adopting a qualitative approach. This was followed by a 
discussion of which SOEs were selected and who was selected to participate. This was 
followed by a discussion on the data collection methods and the data analysis 
procedures. Finally, the criteria to ensure the trustworthiness of the study was 
mentioned as were the ethical considerations.   
 
The next chapter will present the findings of the empirical component of the study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter discussed the research approach and design applied in the study 
as well as the method used to select the cases (SOEs) and participants. Data collection 
and analysis were also described, followed by a discussion of trustworthiness and 
ethical considerations.   
 
This chapter will present the analysis and discussion of the research findings. The 
discussion will start with the interpretation and reporting style, followed by an overview 
of the participants’ profiles. The context of the interviews will be described and 
thereafter the empirical findings will be presented and discussed, guided by the 
theoretical framework of the factors influencing the effectiveness of ACs, as discussed 
in Chapter 2 (section 2.10).   
 
4.2 INTERPRETATION AND REPORTING STYLE 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, data analysis involves systematically putting data in order, 
classifying and arranging it in order to extract meaning. This is to enable the researcher 
to draw empirical conclusions from the data (Polit & Beck, 2008; Kohlbacher, 2005). 
Semi-structured, in-depth, individual interviews were conducted with participants, 
observations in the form of field notes were made and the annual reports and charters 
of the ACs were reviewed in order to achieve the research objective.  
 
The researcher started with data analysis by organising the collected data into computer 
files documenting each SOE. These included the audio recordings of the interviews. To 
facilitate the analysis of the data, a total of 282.39 minutes of audio files was given to a 
transcriber for transcription. This was a necessary step because transcription is labour-
intensive and the transcriber enhances the credibility thanks to their independence and 
professional expertise (Creswell, 2014).  
  
61 
Each transcribed interview was then saved as a separate file in the sequence in which 
the interviews took place. The files were named in a way that allowed easy linkage to 
the interview audio. The researcher then immersed himself in the detail of the data by 
reading and re-reading the transcripts. This was necessary to extract sense from the 
collected data (Creswell, 2014).  
 
The transcribed files were then inserted into Atlas.ti version 8 for further analysis and 
coding. Using Atlas.ti, the researcher opened a document and started reading and re-
reading the data while highlighting text segments and assigning a code word or phrase 
that best described the meaning of the segment. When assigning a code to text 
segments, the researcher was cognisant of the research objective and theoretical 
framework of factors influencing the effectiveness of ACs. Each code created through 
Atlas.ti consisted of the primary document number and the number indicating the order 
in which the code was created. During the process of assigning codes, codes that were 
similar were linked to each other and grouped to form categories. The categories were 
then reviewed and refined into five final themes, provided there was sufficient data to 
support them. The themes and categories reflected different groupings and 
relationships identified using the main interview questions.  
 
Transcripts of interviews were imported into Atlas.ti in the order in which the interviews 
took place. Atlas.ti provided the referencing method used to present the empirical 
findings. The reference “D2:8” for example, is referenced as follows: “D” refers to the 
primary document, number “2” represents the second participant or interviewee and 
number “8” represents the code number from source document number “2”.  
 
The copies of annual reports and AC charters of participating SOEs that were obtained 
or made available to the researcher for review were also inserted into Atlas.ti. The 
software also provided the reference method to present empirical findings or to verify 
the views expressed by the participants during the interviews. In the reference “D8:1”, 
for example, the “D” refers to the primary document, number “8” represents the 
document number and number “1” represents the code number from source document 
number “8”. Some of the findings were supported by verbatim quotes provided by the 
research participants and these were indented and displayed in inverted commas. 
Shorter verbatim quotes that were used as part of the researcher’s paraphrasing were 
displayed in inverted commas. Despite maintaining the anonymity of the participants, 
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the relevance of their respective responses was enhanced by using two broad 
perspectives, namely, AC member(s) and non-AC member(s). Verbatim quotes that 
revealed gender such as “he” or “she” were supplemented by using words such as 
“they” to further protect the anonymity of the participants (Saldaña, 2011).  
 
Through the analysis process, the researcher arrived at findings using an inductive 
process of reasoning. Inductive reasoning involves making concrete observations and 
analysing data in order to arrive at new and general concepts (Yin, 2011). The analysis 
and interpretation of the empirical data allowed the researcher to make observations 
and draw conclusions about ACs at Namibian SOEs.  
 
A summary of the participant groups and references to the participants are shown in 
table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 Participant groups and references to the participants 
Participant group References to participants 
 
Non-AC members (referred to as non-AC participants) 
 
D1; D3; D4; D5; D6; D9; D10 
AC members (referred to as AC participants) 
 
D2; D7; D8 
 
A summary of the groups of SOE documents reviewed and references to the reviewed 
documents are shown in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2 Groups of SOE documents reviewed and references to the reviewed 
documents  
Groups of documents reviewed References to the reviewed documents 
 
SOE AC charter 
 
D12; D13 
SOE Annual report 
 
D15; D17 
 
To prevent findings from being biased, the empirical findings were discussed in the third 
person (Saldaña, 2011). Where possible, information obtained from the interviews was 
validated with information from relevant SOE documents.  
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4.3 PARTICIPANT PROFILES 
 
Ten interviews were conducted with the following participants: two AC chairpersons, 
one AC member, three CAEs, one human resources executive and three CFOs. One 
AC chairperson who was invited, did not respond to invitations to participate in the 
study, therefore another member of the AC was interviewed instead. It also emerged 
during the interviews that one of the CAEs had no interaction with the AC and that the 
AC reported directly to the human resources executive, therefore an invitation to 
participate in the study was extended to the human resources executive who had 
interaction with the AC. One of the CAEs who participated was an outsourced external 
audit firm who had access to the AC. This resulted in ten interviews being conducted. 
The description of the participants and their attendance of AC meetings is provided in 
Table 4.3 below.  
 
Table 4.3 Description of participants and involvement in audit committee meetings  
Description AC member  
(Yes/No) 
Attend AC 
meetings 
(Yes/No) 
Independent non-executive board member, D2 Yes Yes 
Independent non-executive board member, D7 Yes Yes 
Independent non-executive board member, D8 Yes Yes 
Chief Financial Officer, D1 No Yes 
Chief Financial Officer, D3 No Yes 
Chief Financial Officer, D4 No Yes 
Chief Audit Executive, D5 No No 
Chief Audit Executive, D6 No Yes 
Chief Audit Executive (outsourced external audit firm), D9  No Yes 
Human Resources executive, D10  No Yes 
 
4.4 CONTEXT OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
Field notes provide a record of observations or conversations which occurred during the 
research (Saldaña, 2011:76; Thorpe & Holt, 2008). The researcher used his field notes 
to describe what happened and the sense he made of the site, situation and participants 
(Creswell, 2014). These field notes were used to provide background to the interviews 
as shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Interviews background  
Description Category 
 
Participant 1 
The participant confirmed the interview as soon as an invitation was forwarded 
through an email. The interview took place in the participant’s work office at 8 
o’clock in the morning. The researcher was nervous because it was the first 
interview. However, when the discussion started, the researcher became calm 
and confidence took over. The participant was also nervous at the beginning 
and was eager to start with the interview. However, the participant complained 
at the beginning that they had been studying the whole night and had to 
prepare for meetings. The participant mentioned the need to maintain a good 
relationship between the internal audit function and the CEO, therefore anything 
that was reported to the AC was first discussed with the SOE’s CEO. The 
participant was straightforward in answering questions and wanted to finish the 
interview and move on to other daily work activities. 
 
CAE 
Participant 2 
The interview was confirmed through the participant’s secretary. The interview 
took place at the participant’s workplace, in the participant’s office. The 
participant made it clear before the interview started that they were happy that 
this was an academic project that had the potential to bring changes to the 
operations of ACs at SOEs. The participant was calm and collected throughout 
the entire discussion, often making reference to their own workplace or making 
general references to how something should be when responding to questions 
asked. The researcher had to be very patient and at times had to direct the 
participant to conclude when the participant was drifting from the intended 
discussion. The interview lasted 58 minutes.     
 
AC 
member 
Participant 3 
The interview was confirmed directly with the participant after several attempts 
had been made through emails and through the participant’s secretary. The 
interview took place in the morning at the participant’s office, 15 minutes later 
than the agreed time. The participant was eager to know how the interview 
would be conducted, whereafter the researcher explained to the participant that 
it would be a discussion whereby questions would be asked by the researcher 
to which the participant would answer. The participant appeared to be well-
prepared, and straightforward in responding to the questions. 
 
CFO 
Participant 4 
The interview was confirmed with the participant. On arrival at the participant’s 
office, the researcher found that the participant had forgotten about the meeting 
and was not in the office. The researcher had to reach the participant on their 
mobile phone after which the participant took 20 minutes to arrive. The 
discussion took place in the office of the participant.  The participant mentioned 
during the interview that they had no direct relationship with the AC, which 
became evident because the participant was unable to provide answers to 
CAE 
  
65 
some of the questions with authority and confidence. The meeting only lasted 
14 minutes because the participant deferred some of the answers to their 
immediate superior. 
 
Participants 5 
The interview was confirmed through the secretary of the participant; however, 
it took time to have the actual interview because of the participant’s busy 
schedule. The participant was preparing for annual audits. The interview took 
place at the participant’s office. During the discussion, it emerged that the 
participant had been acting in the position and had few interactions with the AC. 
During the interview, the researcher had to ask more follow up questions to 
ensure that the participant understood the questions and responded 
appropriately.  
 
CFO 
Participant 6 
The interview was confirmed through the secretary of the participant. The 
interview took place at the office of the participant. The participant appeared 
nervous throughout the entire discussion and was careful to give general 
answers to questions and at times they read off answers from a specific 
document. However, the participant provided sufficient information because 
they had many years of experience interacting with the AC.    
 
HR 
Participant 7 
The interview was confirmed directly with the participant. However, at the first 
scheduled date for the interview, the researcher was disappointed because the 
participant was not at the office and only informed the researcher that the 
interview had to be postponed, when called by the researcher. The interview 
took place at the participant’s private office. The participant was not collected 
and wanted to finish the interview as quickly as possible because another 
meeting was scheduled. The interview was often interrupted by the ringing of 
the participant’s cellular phone. It emerged during the interview that the 
participant was not familiar with financial terms and jargon.   
  
AC 
member 
Participant 8 
The interview was confirmed directly with the participant. The interview took 
place at the participant’s workplace. The researcher was looking forward to this 
interview because of the confidence gained during the interviews with the 
previous participants. What also gave the researcher confidence was the 
participant’s enthusiasm and response to emails and phone calls. The 
participant was relaxed throughout the interview. Although this participant was 
acting in the position at the time of the interview, they were willing to share their 
experiences with ACs both in the public and private sector.  
 
CFO 
Participant 9 
The interview was confirmed directly with the participant’s secretary. This 
participant was looking forward to the interview and wanted to know beforehand 
what the discussion would be about. The interview took place in the boardroom 
at the participant’s workplace. The participant was straightforward and 
professional in their answers.  
CAE 
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Participant 10 
The interview was confirmed directly with the participant. The interview was 
long overdue because it had to take place a month after the first day the 
interview was requested because the participant’s SOE was busy with annual 
audits. The participant was very professional and gave corroborating 
documents to support answers. 
CFO 
 
No further interviews were considered necessary because the researcher believed that 
data saturation had been reached by noting the recurring categories and themes that 
emerged from the data analysis.  
 
4.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The empirical findings presented in this study were derived from the transcribed 
interviews and relevant company documents (annual reports for the years ended 2015 
and 2016 and AC charters). Chapter 2 (section 2.10) discussed the theoretical 
framework consisting of the factors that influence the effectiveness of ACs in SOEs: i) 
the source of the AC’s power and authority to carry out its mandate, ii) the composition 
of the AC in terms of skills, experience and size, iii) how the AC manages its activities to 
achieve its oversight responsibilities, iv) the performance of the AC members 
collectively and individually and v) how the AC accounts for what it was entrusted to 
carry out. The empirical findings will be presented according to the theoretical 
framework outlined above. Each section will start with the presentation of the theme 
followed by a detailed discussion of the categories. Table 4.5 shows the themes and 
categories for ease of presentation. 
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Table 4.5 Themes and categories related to the factors that influence the 
effectiveness of SOE ACs  
Themes  Categories 
Mandate of the AC • Empowerment of the AC 
• Appointment of members to serve on the AC 
Composition of the AC • Size of the AC 
• Independence of AC members 
• Skills and experience of AC members 
• Existence of financial expert on AC 
Managing the activities of 
the AC  
• Role of the chairperson of the AC 
• Resources of the AC 
• Role of the AC in the activities of the internal audit function 
• Role of the AC in the activities of the finance functions 
• Role of the AC in the activities of the external auditors 
• Role of the AC in compliance 
• Role of the AC in risk management 
• Frequency of meetings, attendance and management of 
meetings 
• Training and development of AC members 
• Principles guiding the activities of the AC 
Performance assessment 
of the AC 
• Performance assessments for the AC and AC members 
• Actions against non-performing AC members 
• Benchmarking of the AC 
Reporting of the AC • A comprehensive AC report  
 
4.5.1 Mandate of the audit committee 
 
It emerged from this study that the ACs of participating SOEs derived their authority 
from approved AC charters (D2:1; D7:1; D8:1). In particular, two participants (D2:53; 
D8:2) revealed that the AC charters were approved by their boards. An approved AC 
charter is in line with the principles of the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.1:1.4), which 
stipulates that the board should approve a written charter for the AC which should 
inform its agenda and work plan. However, the researcher noted during the interviews 
that some of the AC participants (D2; D8) were unaware of the content of the AC 
charters nor were they able to make any specific reference to the charter. Furthermore, 
three participants (D2:70; D8:68; D7:36) were not able to provide the researcher with a 
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copy of their charter but instead referred him to the company secretary or legal 
department for a copy. Yet, according to Salehi et al. (2012), AC members ought to 
demonstrate knowledge of their AC charters which should contain clear and measurable 
strategic objectives to be achieved within a defined period. Demonstrating knowledge of 
the charter by an AC member may be construed as a sign of a strong and effective AC.  
 
The participants (D2:5; D8:3) further revealed that some of the charters were not 
reviewed on a regular basis. In particular, one participant (D8:3) revealed that:  
 
“In my mind, if you have a proper audit committee charter it should last you for a 
long time. But, yes, at times demands may change. But it’s not fixed … there is 
really no need to review it annually.” 
 
Again, another participant (D2:5) revealed that:  
 
“Not regular enough ... The one from [SOE] is about five years ago it was done 
…” 
 
Although the AC charters were not reviewed regularly, one of the participant’s (D13:1) 
charter makes provision for it to be amended from time to time as required, while 
another participant’s (D12:1) charter states that the AC should review it at regular 
intervals. These findings (D8:3; D2:5; D13:1; D12:1) are not in line with the NamCode 
(NSX, 2014:2.23:23.2) or Bromilow and Keller’s (2011) views that the AC charter should 
be reviewed every year and any changes should be approved by the board. Reviewing 
the charter on a regular basis ensures that it is updated and incorporates any legal or 
regulatory changes that may have occurred (Bromilow & Keller, 2011).  
 
It also emerged that some AC members were appointed from the SOEs’ board (D2:8; 
D7:30). SOE board members are appointed by the minister responsible for the specific 
SOE, therefore AC members are appointed from the available board members 
(Namibia, 2015). Two AC participants (D2:54; D8:7) revealed that the issue of 
appointment to serve on the AC is discussed at board meetings and nomination is done 
by selecting people with financial experience and who are willing to serve on the AC. 
However, one participant (D8:8) revealed that there are no specific requirements for one 
to become an AC member:   
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“…not specific requirements for an audit committee member, no. And that’s 
maybe something we should consider.” 
 
Although the findings (D2:54; D8:7) did not reveal further details of how the board 
handles the nomination of the members to serve on the AC, the NamCode (NSX, 
2014:3.2:2.4) proposes that nomination should be the responsibility of a nomination 
committee of the board. Similarly, in line with the NamCode, Beasley et al. (2009) and 
Carcello et al. (2007:1) state that the role of management and the CEO in the 
appointment of potential members of the AC could diminish the independence of the AC 
and may in turn reduce its effectiveness.   
 
This study further revealed from the interviews with participants (D2:9; D8:9) that some 
of the chairpersons of the boards made the appointments of the AC chairperson. It also 
emerged (D8:9) that the CEO and management of one of the SOEs made 
recommendations for the appointment of AC chairpersons.  In this regard, one 
participant (D8:9) reported that:  
 
“The chairman of the audit committee, like the members of the audit committee 
would normally be appointed by the board from a recommendation either by 
management or a decision between the chairman of the board and CEO or 
managing director.” 
 
These findings are not in line with the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.1), which states that the 
chairperson of the AC should be appointed collectively by the board with minimal or no 
involvement by management. Similarly, the IIA stipulates that the appointment of the AC 
chairperson, as in the case of AC members, should be handled by the board’s 
nomination committee (IIA, 2014).  
 
4.5.2 Composition of the audit committee 
 
During the interviews, it emerged that one SOE had four AC members serving on its AC 
(D6:12), while two SOEs had five members. These numbers are in line with the 
minimum of three and maximum of six members recommended by the IIA (2014:4) and 
the NamCode (2014:3.2). The Institute (2014b:4) clarifies that less than six members is 
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manageable and will allow members to actively participate in discussions. However, 
some participants reported that the number of members serving on the AC was 
influenced by the size of the board of the SOE (D2:55; D7:37; D8:51). One participant 
(D8:52) explained that the size of the AC should not be too big to avoid AC meetings 
being overcrowded, but should also not be too small so that the AC members would not 
be intimidated by the management representatives. Accordingly the participant (D8:12) 
revealed that: 
 
“… it must just be a practical composition. With independent directors serving on 
an audit committee or committees of the board, sometimes not all of them can be 
there and then you struggle with a quorum …” 
 
The views of the participants (D2:55; D7:37; D8:51) are in line with those of Rainsbury 
et al. (2012) that a large AC may prove cumbersome and that the most appropriate size 
should provide room for AC members to freely participate in discussions. 
 
It was noted from the annual report (D17:3) and AC charter (D12:2) of one of the SOEs 
that a CEO was among the AC members. Having an executive director among the 
members of the AC is not supported by the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.2), which 
recommends that ACs should be composed completely of independent, non-executive 
directors. An AC that is composed of independent directors is able to objectively assess 
the quality of the SOE’s financial statements and the adequacy of internal controls 
(Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009; Oshima, 2005:52). Furthermore, a participant 
(D8:10) revealed that one CEO played a pivotal role in electing board members to serve 
on the AC of their SOE. The involvement of a CEO in the selection of board members to 
serve on the AC could compromise the independence of the AC (Beasley et al., 2009; 
Carcello et al., 2007:1). Nonetheless, to ensure the independence of AC members, one 
participant (D2:12) revealed that it was a requirement for AC members to declare any 
conflicts of interest at each meeting of the AC.  
 
Individuals who serve on the AC should be appropriately skilled, experienced and 
diligent (IIA, 2014). This study revealed that one of the ACs included one member with 
auditing experience who was a qualified chartered accountant, another with a legal 
background, one from the banking sector and one from the financial sector (D8:53; 
LinkedIn, 2018). Accordingly one participant (D10:15) reported that: 
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“... but [that person] is a chartered accountant, and other members come from the 
banking industry. So, for me, they bring quite a good mix of the theoretical 
knowledge as well as practical knowledge and I think that what’s really helpful is 
he is having seasoned people that bring a perspective, a maturity when looking 
at that and willing to ask difficult questions in such a way that it actually focuses 
on the company and not on the issue.” 
 
An AC that has members with appropriate skills and experience is able to make 
judgements related to internal controls (IoDSA, 2009:13-14). In contrast, however, one 
AC included a member with a legal background, another member with economics, 
statistics and marketing experience and another with media qualifications (D7:40; 
LinkedIn, 2018). Although this AC could be well positioned to be aware of matters 
concerning legal liability threats, it would have been better equipped had there been a 
member with a financial background to provide a balancing role in monitoring financial 
reporting (Krishnan et al., 2011). Another AC comprised someone with an engineering, 
marketing and banking background and did not have any member with experience in 
finance and auditing (D19:1; LinkedIn, 2018). In this regard, one participant (D3:14) 
commented as follows:  
 
“We are sitting with an audit committee that does not have a finance person in it. 
…The rest of the audit committee members are not finance people.” 
 
This type of combination of experience and skills may impair the ability of the AC to 
effectively challenge and question internal and external auditors’ audit findings or reach  
consensus on complex financial issues since the members are likely to lack sufficient 
financial knowledge (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013; Robinson & Owens-Jackson, 2009).  
 
It became apparent during the discussion with the AC participants that they were 
unfamiliar with the skills and experience of fellow members serving on the ACs (D2:16; 
D7:3; D8:54). The participants could only refer to their own skills and experience. In this 
regard, one participant (D8:54) made the following remark:  
 
“In our case I doubt, I think it is only me that has that experience.” 
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The ACs of SOEs can be strengthened and the corporate governance of SOEs can be 
enhanced if records are maintained to show the skills and experience of the AC 
members. According to Redman (2009), when the skills and experience of AC members 
are known, it is easier to identify members who are not knowledgeable about a 
particular aspect and who may need further development. It also helps to determine 
how the content and layout of information is to be presented to members. Furthermore, 
knowing the skills and experience of AC members will ultimately help the SOE to create 
an AC that meets its specific needs (Armitage, 2011).  
 
It emerged during the interviews that one AC had a member (D10:16) with a financial 
background that met the requirements of a financial expert. In contrast, another AC 
(D3:14) did not have a member meeting the requirements of a financial expert. Although 
a participant (D7:4) revealed that the other AC had a financial expert, the qualifications 
and experience profile (LinkedIn, 2018) of that individual did not meet the requirements 
of a financial expert. This member only had qualifications in economics (LinkedIn, 
2018). The characteristics of a financial expert were defined in Chapter 2 (section 
2.10.2). One AC participant (D7:6) claimed that the absence of a financial expert in the 
AC was because the governing structure of the SOE did not approve the appointment of 
a designated financial expert. However, this view contradicted the AC charter (D13:3) of 
their SOE, which made provision for members with significant, relevant and recent 
financial experience. An AC without a financial expert, according to Grenier et al. 
(2012), does little to assure stakeholders that the AC members are well-qualified to 
manage the audit process. A financial expert can assist the AC to evaluate financial 
statements, improve the quality of financial reporting and focus on internal control of the 
SOE (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013).   
 
4.5.3 Managing the activities of the audit committee 
 
4.5.3.1 Role of the chairperson of the audit committee  
 
The interviews revealed that the chairpersons of two ACs (D3:18; D10:15) took a 
leading role in driving the activities of their ACs. This is aligned with literature that 
suggests that the chairperson of the AC is at the helm of the AC and should steer the 
AC meetings (Deloitte, 2012). This involves setting the tone and encouraging each 
member’s participation, thereby strengthening the AC and enhancing the corporate 
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governance of the SOE (Deloitte, 2012). Similarly, one participant (D9:25) expressed 
that the chairperson of the AC should take the lead in discussions, should be supportive 
at meetings and should not be ‘surprised’ when issues were discussed at meetings. 
This is what the participant (D9:25) had to say: 
 
“… because he is supposed to lead the meeting, we don’t want him to be caught 
blind-sided. So that he knows what the issues are and also from our side if we 
feel like management isn’t performing as it should or not taking action.” 
 
The views of the participant (D9:25) are consistent with Bruynseels et al. (2015) insofar 
as in meeting their responsibilities, the AC chairperson is expected to promote the 
effective functioning of the committee and to serve as the primary liaison between the 
AC and the board and management.  Likewise, for the AC to be effective and to 
strengthen the SOE’s corporate governance, the AC requires an experienced 
chairperson with strong leadership skills, good facilitation skills, the ability to foster 
effective working relations among members and to drive the AC’s activities (Leblanc, 
2007). Based on the comments of two non-AC participants (D10:15; D9:20), it 
transpired, however, that one AC chairperson did not play an active role in the activities 
of the AC. According to the participant (D9:20):  
 
“… the chairman of the audit committee has resigned and he wasn’t active in 
previous meetings in any case.” 
 
The views expressed by these two participants (D9:20; D10:15) about the chairperson’s 
leadership role are in line with Leblanc’s (2007) view that without an effective 
chairperson, the AC is unlikely to make a positive contribution to corporate governance. 
This is confirmed by Zaman and Sarens (2013), who state that an AC chairperson has 
an important role to play in leading the AC to make a valid contribution to corporate 
governance.  
 
With regard to the qualifications of the AC chairpersons, it emerged that one AC 
chairperson was an engineer by profession, and at the time of the interview, had been 
leading the AC for more than six years (D3:28; D2:11). Another AC chairperson (D8:55) 
was a chartered accountant by profession, with more than 20 years’ experience, 
including being a managing partner at one of the Big Four accounting firms. This 
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individual also had prior experience as a chairperson of an AC and as a member of an 
AC. Another AC chairperson (D7:29) had a qualification in law and had also been 
leading their AC for more than six years. Bruynseels et al. (2015:4) maintain that an AC 
chairperson with financial and/or accounting expertise, compared to an AC chairperson 
with engineering or law qualifications, would make a more meaningful contribution to the 
quality of the financial reporting process. Such expertise provides the chairperson with 
good leadership skills to oversee the AC agenda and to ensure an appropriate mix of 
financial and non-financial skills among AC members. This view is also supported by 
Abernathy, Beyer, Masli and Stefaniak (2014) who note that an AC chairperson with 
accounting expertise contributes to more timely financial reporting when compared to a 
chairperson without a financial qualification. In addition, Abernathy et al. (2014) suggest 
that a chairperson with an accounting qualification would strengthen the AC and 
enhance the SOE’s corporate governance. In fact, the AC chairperson should also 
understand financial reporting issues to direct the AC’s focus to high-risk areas affecting 
financial reporting, risk management and internal controls (Turley & Zaman, 2007).  
  
4.5.3.2 Resources of the audit committee 
 
The study confirmed that the ACs of the selected SOEs had resources in the form of 
financial and management support at their disposal to effectively carry out their 
activities. One non-AC participant (D3:17) indicated that their AC had an unlimited 
budget with which the AC could execute its activities. Similarly, another AC participant 
(D8:44) indicated that all activities such as sitting allowances, workshops and 
conferences were adequately catered for under the directors’ fees budget line item. The 
findings of the study about the financial and management support of the ACs are 
confirmed by Alleyne et al. (2006:570) who note that the AC should have enough 
resources at its disposal to effectively fulfil its oversight responsibilities.  
  
4.5.3.3  Role of the audit committee in the activities of the internal audit function 
 
ACs play an important role in the effectiveness of the internal audit function by ensuring 
the adequacy of scope for internal audit activities and reviewing internal audit 
programmes. This is because the internal audit function can be useful to the AC in 
performing its duties and can enhance its effectiveness (Yasin & Nelson, 2012). In 
particular, two non-AC participants (D1:7; D6:3) indicated that the process to appoint 
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the head of the internal audit function was handled by the management of their 
respective SOEs. Furthermore, two non-AC participants (D4:11; D6:3) revealed that the 
competency, qualification and remuneration criteria for the position of head of internal 
audit are pre-determined, just like any other position in the SOE, and are reviewed by 
the human resources board committee, with no involvement of the AC. This finding is 
not supported by the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.7:7.2) which stipulates that the AC should 
be responsible for the appointment, performance assessment and dismissal of the head 
of internal audit. One non-AC participant (D9:4), however, indicated that their AC 
recommended the appointment of co-sourced or outsourced internal auditors to the 
board for approval, which is in agreement with the recommendation of the NamCode 
(NSX, 2014:3.7.7.2), which states that ACs should be involved in the staffing of the 
head of the internal audit function. Co-sourcing internal auditors refers to a combination 
of internal audit responsibilities using the resources of both internal and external service 
providers (Deloitte, 2011). Outsourcing internal auditors is when the activities of the 
internal audit function of a SOE are entirely outsourced to an external service provider 
(Deloitte, 2011). Further studies should be done to establish the effectiveness of co-
sourced internal audit functions in Namibian SOEs. However, participants (D9:4; D9:6) 
indicated that the qualifications and competencies of members of the team of an 
outsourced internal audit company are considered in the evaluation report which is 
reviewed and recommended by the AC for approval by the board, which is in agreement 
with the recommendations of the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.7.7.2).  
 
The AC of the participating SOEs (D1:11; D8:23; D9:10) reviewed and approved the 
internal audit plans including the budget of the internal audit function prior to the 
commencement of activities by the internal auditors. One non-AC participant (D9:10) 
remarked: 
 
“… on an annual basis we [internal audit function] put together an audit plan with 
a budget attached to it, which is a proposal; which they [AC] need to review and 
approve or recommend for approval to the board.” 
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Another non-AC participant (D1:11) observed the following: 
 
“Once we [internal audit function] are done with that process, then we sell it to 
management then we finally take it to the audit committee for approval. And audit 
committee also again have the right to add or omit some of the audits. But 
whatever now the final product is we take it as an approved internal audit plan by 
the audit committee.” 
 
These findings (D1:11; D9:10) of AC involvement in the review of the internal audit 
plans are supported by the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.7:7.3), which states that the AC 
should approve the internal audit plan as well as oversee the staffing of the internal 
audit function. This is because the internal audit function can strengthen the AC to 
effectively discharge its responsibilities. 
 
Three non-AC participants (D1:10; D4:5; D9:8) indicated that their ACs approved the 
internal audit charter of their SOEs. In particular, one non-AC participant (D9:8) 
revealed that their AC had recently participated in the approval of the internal audit 
function of the SOE. The AC approving the internal audit charter is in agreement with 
the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing which 
prescribe that the AC should approve the internal audit charter (IIA, 2017:1110).  
 
One AC participant (D8:57) revealed that their AC reviewed the internal audit reports. 
Another AC participant (D2:22), however, revealed that they had not seen a report from 
the internal auditors in a long time, despite the AC approving the internal audit plans. 
The review of the internal audit reports by the AC is in line with the IIA (2017), which 
recommends that together with management and the CAE, the AC should review the 
activities of the internal audit function. However, the finding that the AC had not seen 
the internal audit report for a long time would do little to ensure the effectiveness of the 
AC in fulfilling its role.  
 
ACs often rely on the work of internal auditors to carry out their duties. One AC 
participant (D2:17) revealed that their AC relied on the work of the internal auditors as a 
tool to assess the quality of internal control in the SOE. Similarly, another non-AC 
participant (D6:10) commented:  
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“… would rely on their [internal auditors] reports because that is how they [AC] 
keep check whether management is implementing all the recommendations of 
the internal auditors. These are the only independent people who can verify that.” 
 
The involvement of the AC in the review of the internal audit reports is corroborated by 
Yasin and Nelson (2012), who state that appreciating the functions and responsibilities 
of the internal audit function could strengthen its role, making it a useful resource for the 
AC in fulfilling its responsibilities. 
 
Two non-AC participants (D1:17; D6:9) revealed that they had met in private with the 
AC on numerous occasions in their capacity as internal auditors. One AC participant 
(D8:26) indicated that they had initiated some meetings where the AC met in private 
with the internal auditors. Such meetings are encouraged by Alzeban and Sawan (2015) 
and should be used to discuss confidential matters. Similarly, the NamCode (NSX, 
2014) recommends that the AC should meet with internal auditors in private without 
management being present. In contrast, however, one non-AC participant revealed that 
the chairperson of their AC was never available to meet in private with internal auditors 
(D9:24): 
 
“But like I mentioned already we do not meet enough [with] of the chair [of the 
AC] on his own, because there has been a mix up there …” 
 
4.5.3.4 Role of the audit committee in the activities of the finance function 
 
From the interviews, it transpired that the ACs expected the finance departments to 
make presentations and provide information for discussion at the AC meetings (D3:13; 
D5:12; D10:11). One non-AC participant (D5:12; D5:18) indicated that the AC expected 
them to make presentations on the finances, budgets and budgetary reviews, financial 
overview and financial position and investments of the SOE at each quarterly AC 
meeting. Another non-AC participant (D10:2) stated that the financial performance of 
the SOE was a standing issue at each meeting of the AC, as was information 
technology and the business plan of the SOE (D10:20). As stated by one participant 
(D10:11), among other things also expected from finance departments and specifically 
from the CFO, was reporting on the funding strategies in place to ensure that the SOE 
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was financially sound and whether the strategies were updated. The CFO should also 
highlight issues of importance regarding the SOE (D10:11).  
 
With regard to the accounting policies, two non-AC participants revealed that the AC 
reviewed and recommended the accounting policies affecting the SOE to the board for 
approval (D3:8; D10:6). The AC expects the information from the finance department to 
be in the standard reporting format and to be accompanied by supporting 
documentation (D2:58). However, some ACs relied only on what was presented by 
management (D3:29). The above comments by the participants are in agreement with 
Oshima’s (2005) views that the AC is expected to have close oversight of the activities 
associated with financial reporting and internal control to uphold the integrity of the 
SOE. However, for ACs to be effective and enhance the SOE’s corporate governance, 
they are expected to have a strong influence on the SOE’s approach to financial 
reporting as opposed to simply relying only on what was presented by management 
(Turley & Zaman, 2004). 
 
4.5.3.5  Role of the audit committee in the activities of the external auditors 
 
ACs have the potential to improve the effectiveness of the external audit by overseeing 
the quality of audits (Yasin & Nelson, 2012). One participant (D2:3; D2:24) reported that 
their AC reviewed and recommended management’s proposal to appoint external 
auditors to the board for approval. Another AC participant (D7:10) affirmed that their AC 
also participated in an evaluation process to appoint an external auditor. However, 
these two participants (D2:25; D7:13) felt that they did not have much influence on who 
should be included in the audit team and the remuneration of the external auditors. 
They merely accepted the staffing and external auditors remuneration contained in the 
auditors’ proposals for appointment as external auditors for the SOE. The fact that the 
views of these participants (D2:25; D7:13) had little influence on the staffing and 
remuneration of external auditors could be attributed to the lack of financial expertise on 
the committee, as reported in section 4.5.2. It could equally be the result of having 
chairpersons with limited experience or qualifications in finance. 
 
One AC participant (D8:27) indicated that their AC was more concerned with the quality 
of work done than the fees charged by the external auditors and expected that the 
external auditors would be professional in executing their duties. This participant’s 
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(D8:27) views are supported by Golalipour (2016) and Bruynseels et al. (2015), who 
maintain that higher quality external audits can lead to external auditors charging higher 
fees.  
 
Two AC participants (D2:59; D8:25) indicated that they had reviewed the scope and 
work plan of the external auditors before they started with work every year. The views 
expressed by these participants concur with Oshima (2005:50), who suggests that ACs 
review the work plan of the external auditors. Furthermore, it places the AC in a better 
position to recommend the annual financial statements for approval by the board (NSX, 
2014). 
 
One AC participant showed full confidence in the independence of the external auditors 
(D2:60), stating that:  
 
“There is no way that the external auditors cannot be independent.” 
 
The AC should monitor and report on the external auditors’ independence and 
objectivity, including defining a policy for board approval addressing the nature, extent 
and terms under which the external auditors may perform non-audit services (NSX, 
2014:3.9.3). 
 
One AC participant (D7:33) revealed that their AC did meet with the external auditors in 
private while another participant (D2:61; D2:72) reported that, to the contrary, their AC 
did not meet in private with external auditors. ACs should, where necessary, meet in 
private with the external auditors as part of fulfilling their oversight duties (Lisic et al., 
2014; Oshima, 2005:50). These views also concur with Golalipour (2016), who 
recommends that ACs meet in private with external auditors to discuss matters that the 
AC believe should be discussed in private. 
 
One participant (D8:67) revealed that their AC used external auditors to verify the work 
of the internal auditors when it was unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from the 
internal auditors. This finding is construed by the researcher to strengthen the AC’s 
effectiveness and contribute to enhancing a SOE’s corporate governance. 
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4.5.3.6  Role of the audit committee in compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements 
 
Two non-AC participants (D3:10; D10:9) reported that a compliance report from the 
legal department or company secretary was among the items that appeared on the 
agenda of every AC meeting (D3:10; 10:9). In particular, this is what one participant 
(D3:10) had to say: 
 
“As far as the quarterly audit and risk meeting is concerned, the company 
secretary provides a compliance matrix that shows all the relevant regulations 
and noting where like what is [the SOE’s] status, is it complying or any deviations 
on that. So, that is reported at least quarterly.” 
 
The views of these two non-AC participants (D3:10; D10:9) are in line with the 
NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.4:4.4) which provides that the AC should be informed about 
any monitoring or enforcement actions against the SOE. One participant, however, had 
a different view, stating that the AC relied on management to be truthful in disclosing the 
SOE’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements in their report (D5:11). 
Furthermore, the participant (D5:23) explained that the AC relied on the reports of the 
internal auditors to point out issues of non-compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements in their reports. Although the ACs may rely on management’s honesty to 
report on compliance and internal auditor reports, the AC would be more effective if it 
was to review and satisfy itself that the SOE indeed had an effective system of 
monitoring compliance in place and that compliance matters were on the agenda for 
every AC meeting (Turley & Zaman, 2004).   
 
4.5.3.7  Role of the audit committee in risk management 
 
The study revealed that the participating SOEs’ ACs considered risk management 
within the SOEs. Indeed, one AC participant (D8:28) indicated that risk management 
was a standing item for discussion at AC meetings. Furthermore, the participant (D8:28) 
indicated that the AC relied on a designated risk management unit within the SOE to 
review risk issues. In this regard, the participant (D8:28) reported that:  
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“… we also have a head of risk, who would attend every meeting and report to us 
on all the different risk matters.” 
 
Another AC participant (D2:27) revealed that their AC assessed risk management by 
reviewing the risk logs maintained by the internal audit function. The AC also relied on 
internal audit to carry out risk management activities and to report, through internal audit 
reports, on how the specific risks highlighted in the risk logs were being managed within 
the SOE. Furthermore, one AC participant (D7:14) revealed that the AC discussed 
issues related to risk management during AC meetings but could not confirm whether 
the SOE has a dedicated unit that handled risk management. The revelations by the 
participants (D8:28; D2:27; D7:14) conform to the provision of the NamCode that the AC 
should have an understanding and have an adequate level of comfort regarding the 
SOE’s process for identifying, managing and reporting risk (NSX, 2014:3.8:8.6). This is 
confirmed by Oshima (2005) who notes that the AC should discuss programmes, 
including the minimisation of present and future litigation risks, policies and procedures 
addressing risk with management (Oshima, 2005). It was observed that some 
participating SOEs used the internal audit function while others did not have a dedicated 
unit within the SOEs to manage risk; this could be a subject of a future study at 
Namibian SOEs. Further research would be required to establish whether risk 
management should be carried out by the internal audit function or by a risk 
management unit. 
 
4.5.3.8  Audit committee meetings 
 
This study revealed that the ACs of the participating SOEs held a minimum of four 
scheduled meetings during the financial year (D2:32; D7:16; D8:33). In addition to these 
meetings, the participants (D2:22; D7:16; D8:33) reported that the ACs also met on an 
ad hoc basis when necessary. These findings are consistent with Bromilow and Keller 
(2011), who state that ACs should hold meetings at least four times a year and should 
also hold ad hoc meetings in addition to scheduled meetings. Likewise, the findings are 
consistent with the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.1:1.7), which stipulates that the AC should 
meet at least twice a year and when necessary.  
 
Bromilow and Keller (2011) suggest that ACs require adequate and ongoing 
administrative assistance to effectively carry out their activities. The participants (D2:52; 
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D7:17; D8:29) confirmed that their ACs enjoyed the support of management in 
scheduling meetings, drafting agendas and preparing board packs through the company 
secretary or legal department. In particular, one participant (D7:18) reported that:  
 
“... we have got electronic devices as well like iPads and most of the time it would 
be the document converted into pdf, portable document format and it’s easy to 
read and our reports would want just high level.” 
 
Likewise, another participant (D8:48) reported that:  
 
“... we have very competent company secretaries and in time you build up a 
normal agenda for such a meeting and they would then prepare all those.” 
 
However, two of the AC participants reported that they had little or no involvement in the 
setting of the agenda for the AC meetings (D7:39; D8:49). Although the findings suggest 
that ACs had support from management, the fact that some AC chairpersons were not 
involved in setting the agenda is not in line with the recommendations of Bromilow and 
Keller (2011) and Deloitte (2012), who propose that the AC, and particularly the AC 
chairperson, should be satisfied that all important issues are covered in the agenda 
before meetings start. According Beasley et al. (2009), when management takes control 
of the AC agenda, there is a risk that the AC may not obtain the right information to fulfil 
its responsibilities. Two participants (D2:62; D8:5) also revealed that the ACs did not 
operate with annual work plans and relied mostly on the reports presented by 
management to set the agenda and discussions during the AC meetings. This finding is 
not in line with the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.1:3.6), which specifies that ACs should 
operate according to annual work plans that address all AC responsibilities. All AC 
participants (D2:56; D7:34; D8:35) were in agreement that the meeting agendas and 
minutes of the previous AC meetings were circulated in time to allow them to provide 
quality input at AC meetings. One participant (D7:26) remarked that:  
 
“Especially the audit area is the biggest part of the board pack so you need more 
time to read, you need more time to make comments.” 
 
This finding is consistent with Bromilow and Keller’s (2011) view, which states that AC 
members should be well-prepared in order to make meaningful contributions during 
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meetings. This can be achieved by circulating important documents well ahead of 
meetings.  
 
It was revealed during the interviews with participants (D2:33; D7:17; D8:34) that CEOs, 
CAEs or outsourced internal auditors and CFOs were among the people who regularly 
attended AC meetings. In addition, one of the AC participants (D8.28) indicated that the 
head of the risk management unit was required to attend meetings of the AC. This is in 
agreement with Deloitte (2012), which recommends that the CEO, CFO, head of 
internal audit, the company secretary and the head of risk management or compliance 
officer should regularly attend AC meetings. The external auditors need only attend AC 
meetings when required, to respond to questions from AC members about concerns 
regarding management, issues concerning finance and internal control, resources and 
the external auditors.  
 
4.5.3.9  Training and development of audit committee members 
 
The study revealed that ACs did not have induction programmes tailor-made for ACs 
and members were only inducted at the board level (D2:64; D7:22; D8:39). Two 
participants (D8:61; D9:17) indicated that training was often only proposed for the board 
of a SOE and not necessarily for the AC. In particular, one non-AC participant (D6:7) 
indicated that the AC did not drive the process to develop and train AC members. 
Instead, it relied on management to identify and propose training. In addition, the AC 
participants (D2:38; D7:22; D8:70) reported that their ACs did not have a programme in 
place to develop the AC members’ skills to enable them to carry out their work 
effectively. One participant (D7:22) commented:  
 
“I have not gone to any training for now that I can say and our term ends 30 
December … I have not gone to any, I have only gone to one training but not any 
audit [AC] function training.” 
 
These findings are not consistent with Leblanc’s (2007) view that ACs should have 
orientation programmes that are comprehensive, formal, tailor-made and well-fitted to 
the environment and industry in which the SOE is operating. In support, Deloitte (2012) 
is of the view that new AC members should specifically be introduced and familiarised 
with control processes and related risks affecting financial reporting before starting with 
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their AC activities. Furthermore, Deloitte (2012) maintains that AC members should 
have technical knowledge before being appointed and that this knowledge should be 
further developed through ongoing training. This could take the form of regular seminars 
or refresher workshops. Such training may result in effective ACs which enhance the 
SOEs’ corporate governance.  
 
4.5.3.10 Principles guiding the activities of the audit committee  
 
One AC participant (D8:63) revealed that their AC adopted the principles of King III and 
the NamCode to guide their operations and reporting on the activities of the AC. This 
was also confirmed in the participating SOE’s annual reports (D17:1). Similarly, another 
AC participant (D7:3) indicated that their AC did not officially adopt a specific code of 
good corporate governance, however, they followed and considered the King reports 
and the NamCode. Although one participant (D8:65) considered that the NamCode and 
King reports should be tailor-made to fit the business of a specific SOE and should not 
be ‘a one size fits all’, the NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.10:10.4) suggests that all 
government institutions, including SOEs, should comply with the minimum criteria 
established in the NamCode. These findings (D8:63; D17:1) demonstrate the 
commitment of some of the ACs to strengthening their role. 
 
4.5.4 Performance assessment of the audit committee 
 
The AC participants (D2:39; D7:23; D8:40) revealed that there were no specific 
performance assessments in place, either for the ACs collectively or for members 
individually. In this regard, one participant (D2:71) reported that:  
 
“It is not done. It is not done and yes, there can be a lot of debate into how it 
should be done … It should be done but it is not done.” 
 
Another participant (D8:40) similarly indicated that their AC’s performance is only 
measured at the board level and not at the AC level while another participant (D7:23) 
reiterated that:  
 
“I have not seen whether the board audit committee performance is measured on 
its own.” 
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The views expressed by the participants (D2:71; D7:23; D8:40) are not in line with 
Bromilow and Keller’s (2011) recommendation that constant assessment of ACs and 
AC members is necessary to establish whether the committee is meeting its oversight 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the views of the participants are not consistent with the 
NamCode (NSX, 2014), which requires regular and timely appraisal of the AC 
chairperson and individual directors. This would result in improved performance of the 
AC, could be used for future training needs or for explaining why a re-appointment may 
or may not be appropriate.  
 
This study further revealed that there were no specific measures taken against non-
performing members. In particular, one participant (D2:68) reported that:  
 
“Currently, no steps are taken for [non-performing members]. But I don’t think it is 
necessary to take steps if people are doing their work.” 
 
Another participant (D8:71) echoed that:  
 
“That’s a tough one. It’s not always easy but it should be there. Yes, 
unfortunately in our case it is a personal thing. It is managed normally by the 
chairman of the board should someone not really perform.” 
 
These findings could be attributed to ACs not having assessments in place to evaluate 
the performance of the chairperson or individual members. Bromilow and Keller (2011) 
caution that failing to take action against non-performing AC members will lead to an AC 
not effectively conducting its activities, as ACs can only be effective if all the AC 
members are actively participating in the work of the AC. 
 
The study also revealed that the ACs of the participating SOEs did not have formal 
processes in place to benchmark activities with best practices (D2:44; D8:66). In this 
regard one participant (D8:66) conveyed that:  
 
“Unfortunately, not. I think individually we do it, because I am involved in a 
number of private big corporations and companies. So, I do it but it’s not a 
formalised review process.” 
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Similarly, another participant (D2:69) recounted that:  
 
“Not directly, there is nothing formal.  We try to look at what is happening at 
others, as I explained I am involved now coincidentally with one SME [small or 
medium entity] and this is another one. So, you actually to a certain extent 
benchmark them against each other.” 
 
These findings (D2:44; D8:66) are not consistent with Bromilow and Keller’s (2011) 
recommendation, that benchmarking AC activities against leading practices will help the 
AC to understand alternative and more efficient approaches to carry out its oversight 
responsibilities.  
 
4.5.5 Reporting of the audit committee 
 
By reviewing the annual reports of the SOEs, it became apparent that one of the annual 
reports (D17) included a comprehensive AC report. This document included i) the 
names of the AC members, ii) a summary of the main activities undertaken during the 
year, iii) the AC’s involvement in the appointment of the external auditors and ensuring 
their independence, iv) the meetings held during the financial year, v) attendance of 
meetings by each member of the AC and vi) specifications as to who, in addition to AC 
members, could attend the meetings of the AC (D17:2). This finding is in line with the 
NamCode (NSX, 2014:3.10), which confirms that the AC should report to the board and 
shareholders on how it discharged its responsibilities, including those assigned during 
the financial year.   
 
In contrast, the annual reports of the other two SOEs only included brief statements 
about the responsibilities of their ACs, without disclosing the names of the members or 
the activities that had been undertaken during the specific financial year (D19; D15). 
These findings (D19; D15) are contrary to the principles of the NamCode (NSX, 
2014:3.10:10.3) which requires that the minimum information to be reported by ACs 
should include the names and qualifications of all AC members, a statement on whether 
the AC had adopted a formal charter, a statement on whether the AC had considered 
the internal audit charter and the number of AC meetings held during the year. The AC 
report should also describe how the AC had carried out its duties in accordance with the 
  
87 
charter and also give information on the independence of the AC (Bromilow & Keller, 
2011).  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter’s main purpose was to present and discuss the study findings related to 
the AC practices in three Namibian SOEs. This was in order to identify factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of these ACs to provide sound corporate governance. 
The findings were obtained through semi-structured interviews with participants from 
selected SOEs, comprising both AC members and non-AC members. In addition, the 
findings were corroborated through a review of the SOEs’ annual reports and AC 
charters, while the researcher’s field notes were also used to support findings.   
 
The chapter discussed the interpretation and reporting style, followed by the 
participants’ profile and thereafter the context of the interviews. The rest of the chapter 
considered the empirical findings within the context of the effectiveness of ACs in 
enhancing SOEs’ corporate governance. The findings were examined in relation to the 
mandate of the AC, the composition of the AC, management of the activities of the AC, 
performance assessments of the AC and its members and reporting by the AC.  
 
The study revealed that some of the ACs functioned with approved AC charters, 
however, the lack of commitment by some ACs to regularly review their charters could 
mean that the AC omit necessary legal or regulatory changes, which could impede the 
effectiveness of the ACs. The fact that the CEOs and management of some SOEs were 
involved in the nomination of AC members could undermine the independence of the 
AC which could, in turn, reduce its effectiveness.  
 
The findings further revealed that the ACs comprised four or five members which was 
well in line with prescribed numbers. One CEO was found to be a member of the AC. 
According to corporate governance best practice, the fact that the CEO is an executive 
director and because of the associated power relationship, the AC would be less able to 
objectively assess the quality of the SOE’s financial statements and adequacy of 
internal controls.  
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It was also revealed by the study that some of the ACs did not include financial experts, 
which put the AC at a disadvantage when evaluating financial statements and improving 
the reporting of the SOE. The study also revealed that AC members were not 
conversant with the skills and experience of the other members serving on the AC. AC 
members not having the required skills and experience has the potential to weaken the 
AC’s ability to discharge its responsibilities. When the skills and experience of AC 
members are known, it is easier to identify members who need further development and 
to determine how the content and layout of information should be presented to AC 
members. In this manner, the SOEs would have ACs that are effective in enhancing the 
governance of SOEs.  
 
This study found that some of the chairpersons of ACs took a leading role in driving the 
activities of their ACs, as suggested by literature, and had appropriate finance 
qualifications or expertise to provide sound leadership skills to oversee the activities of 
the AC. It also emerged that some of the AC chairpersons did not have an appropriate 
finance qualification or financial accounting expertise, which would have ensured an 
appropriate mix of financial and non-financial skills among AC members. The study 
further revealed that participating ACs enjoyed resources from their SOEs, both in terms 
of financial and management support to carry out their activities. However, the 
adequacy of resources is an area for future research. 
 
The findings revealed that only some of the ACs were involved in the staffing of the 
heads of the internal audit function, including recommending the appointment of the co-
sourced/outsourced internal auditors for board approval. The fact that some ACs did not 
participate in this process could undermine the effectiveness of the AC as ACs rely on 
the internal audit function to review internal controls. Some of the ACs participated in 
the approval of the internal audit charter and considered and approved the internal audit 
plan, including the budget for the internal audit function, prior to the commencement of 
activities by the internal auditors. Although some ACs reviewed the reports of the 
internal auditors, others have not seen the internal auditors’ reports. It was found that 
some ACs relied on the work of the internal auditors as a tool to increase their 
confidence about the strength of the internal controls of the SOE. Two ACs met with the 
internal auditors in private to discuss issues that should be discussed confidentially, 
while one AC was unable to meet in private with the internal auditors.  
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As revealed by the findings of this study, the ACs’ expectation from the finance 
departments to make presentations and provide information for discussions at AC 
meetings about the funding strategies in place, may strengthen the AC to ensure that 
the SOEs were financially sound and their strategies were updated. In line with 
literature, the findings revealed that the ACs reviewed management’s proposals to 
appoint external auditors and recommended these to the board for approval. In addition, 
some of the ACs considered the independence of the external auditors.  
 
Some of the ACs of the participating SOEs considered compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations and required a compliance report from the legal department or company 
secretary to be among the items always included in the agenda of the AC. However, 
other ACs relied on management to be truthful in disclosing the compliance with legal 
and regulatory requirements while others relied on the reports of the internal auditors to 
identify non-compliance within their SOEs.   
 
Risk management was also considered by the participating ACs. In particular, some 
ACs had risk management among the items that were regularly discussed at meetings. 
Other ACs reviewed the risk logs of their SOE. In addition, some ACs relied on the 
internal auditors to carry out risk management activities and to report through their 
internal audit reports on how the specific risks highlighted in the risk logs had been 
managed within the SOE. Other ACs relied on the risk management unit at the SOE to 
review the risk issues. The question of whether risk management should be carried out 
by the internal audit function or by a risk management unit falls outside the scope of this 
study. 
 
The ACs did not have a specified annual work plan and they relied mostly on the reports 
presented by management to dictate the agenda and discussion at the AC meetings. 
The ACs also did not have a specific induction programme for new members, nor did 
they have a programme to develop the AC members’ skills to carry out their work more 
effectively. The ACs did little to drive the process of training AC members, but such 
training often came as proposals from management.  
 
The study also revealed that some of the ACs in this study adopted the principles of the 
King III report and the NamCode in guiding their operations and reporting on their 
activities. However, some of the ACs had not adopted a specific code of good corporate 
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governance. As shown by the study findings, there seems to be a lack of formal and 
specific performance assessment, both collectively for the ACs and individually for AC 
members. This may weaken the role of ACs as it would be difficult establish whether the 
AC was meeting its oversight responsibilities. It would also be difficult to note individual 
members’ performance towards the effectiveness of the AC. Moreover, the results 
revealed that there were no processes in place to take action against non-performing 
members, which could lead to ACs not effectively carrying out their responsibilities, 
thereby weakening the contribution of the AC to enhancing corporate governance at 
SOEs. 
 
The findings show that while two of the SOEs’ annual reports only included brief 
statements about the responsibilities of the ACs, the third SOE’s annual report included 
a comprehensive AC report with not only a summary of the main activities undertaken 
by the AC during the year, but also the names of the AC members and their attendance 
at meetings. This demonstrates ACs’ effectiveness in enhancing SOEs’ corporate 
governance.  
 
The next chapter will present an overview of the study, conclusions and 
recommendations for future research based on the findings of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter presented the analysis and discussion of the research findings. 
This chapter will present the conclusion of the study based on the research objective, 
methodology and empirical findings. The chapter will start with an overview of the 
research, reflecting on the objective of the study, it will then summarise the main points 
of the literature review and the research methodology. Conclusions on the findings will 
then be drawn to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected 
Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. Thereafter, the chapter will 
consider the limitations of the study, make suggestions for future research and indicate 
the importance of the study. 
 
5.2 STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the research topic, highlighting the importance of 
corporate governance and introducing the AC as an important element of corporate 
governance. If effective, the AC can ensure the integrity of annual reports and internal 
financial controls and can manage financial risks. The chapter states the objective of 
this study as follows: The study seeks to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness 
of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. Chapter 1 
also addressed the delineation of the study, touched upon the research methodology 
and ethical considerations and summarised the study layout.   
 
Chapter 2 started by providing an overview of the public sector and SOEs in Namibia, 
followed by a discussion of corporate governance structure. The chapter continued with 
the origin and development of ACs followed by a definition for the concept AC. The 
governance purpose and responsibilities of ACs were described and thereafter, the 
benefits of an effective AC were indicated, as well as the changing expectations of ACs. 
Finally, the chapter listed the factors that influence the effectiveness of ACs within the 
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context of SOEs, namely, the mandate, composition, management of activities, 
performance assessment and reporting. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the research approach and design adopted in the study. A 
qualitative descriptive case study research design was used to identify factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of the ACs in SOEs. The chapter also discussed the 
selection of the cases, which was done purposively, targeting a homogenous sub-group 
of SOEs in order to best understand the phenomenon of ACs. The empirical data was 
collected primarily through interviews with participants, who comprised AC 
chairpersons, CFOs, CAEs and one HR representative. The data was also collected 
through the review of relevant SOE documents (annual reports and ACs charters). The 
chapter then described the data analysis, which was conducted using an inductive 
process of reasoning which allowed the researcher to make observations and draw 
conclusions. The chapter ended with a discussion of the trustworthiness of the study as 
well as the ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 4 began by discussing the reporting style of the data. Once the interview audio 
files were transcribed, the data was analysed and coded using Atlas.ti. The emergent 
categories and themes formed the basis upon which the empirical findings of the study 
were presented.  
 
The next section will discuss the conclusions on the factors contributing to the 
effectiveness of the ACs of three Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate 
governance. The discussion is based on the findings presented in Chapter 4. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS ON FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES OF THREE NAMIBIAN STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES  
 
The study conclusions will be presented within the context of the themes that emerged 
from the study, namely, the mandate of the AC, the composition of the AC, managing 
the activities of the AC, performance assessments of the AC and its members and the 
reporting of the AC. 
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5.3.1 Mandate of the audit committee 
 
The ACs of some of the SOEs operated with AC charters which were approved by the 
board. This charter provides an institutional mandate to the ACs and also informs the 
agenda and work plan, thereby improving the effectiveness of the ACs. Some AC 
members, however, failed to demonstrate knowledge of their ACs’ charters, which is a 
sign of weakness in an AC because charters provide clear and measurable strategic 
objectives to be achieved within a defined period. Another finding was that the AC 
charters were not reviewed on a yearly basis, which suggests that the charters were not 
updated and may have omitted legal or regulatory changes.  
 
When appointing members to serve on the AC, some ACs did not have specific 
requirements, which could negatively affect the operations of the AC. In addition, 
members were not appointed by a nomination committee of the board, which could 
result in the committees not having the required skills to operate effectively. It was also 
noted that some of the CEOs played a role in the appointments, which could undermine 
the independence of the AC. The appointment of members should be the sole preserve 
of a nomination committee of the board, with minimal involvement by management or 
the CEO. 
  
5.3.2 Composition of the audit committee 
 
The number of members serving on the ACs ranged from four to five which is well 
acceptable, as literature suggests a minimum of three and a maximum of six. However, 
it was noted that some of the participating SOEs had CEOs serving as members which 
can weaken the ability of the AC to objectively assess the quality of financial statements 
and the adequacy of internal controls. The ACs should comprise solely independent, 
non-executive directors; CEOs should regularly attend the meetings of ACs to serve as 
an information resource by answering questions or clarifying any issues that may arise. 
 
Some AC members did not have the appropriate accounting or auditing background nor 
did they have members who could be deemed financial experts. This can undermine the 
AC’s ability to challenge and question internal and external auditors’ findings or to reach 
consensus on complex financial issues. An AC composed of members with appropriate 
experience in finance would be able to make informed judgements related to internal 
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controls and could monitor the financial reporting of the SOE. Furthermore, a financial 
expert would contribute to the strength of the AC by assisting it to evaluate financial 
statements, improve the quality of financial reporting and focus on internal control of the 
SOE. 
 
The AC members in this study were unaware of the mix of skills and experience 
possessed by their fellow members. This implies that the members needing further 
development are not identified. Having a sound grasp of the skills and experience of AC 
members will gear the SOE towards creating an effective AC that is able to offer 
independent oversight of financial reporting processes and internal control.   
 
5.3.3 Managing the activities of the audit committee 
 
Experience, strong leadership skills, good facilitation skills and the ability to foster 
effective working relations among AC members enabled some AC chairpersons to take 
a leading role in driving the activities of their ACs. These qualities contributed to the 
ACs’ effectiveness insofar as the AC chairperson would be able to set the tone and 
encourage full participation by members. However, some of the chairpersons played 
only a minor role in the affairs of the committee, thereby diluting the effectiveness of the 
AC. 
 
Some AC chairpersons did not possess the appropriate financial or accounting 
qualifications, which could otherwise have strengthened the AC by ensuring an 
appropriate mix of financial and non-financial skills among its members. An AC 
chairperson with an appropriate financial qualification contributes to timely financial 
reporting and directing the AC’s focus to high-risk areas affecting financial reporting, risk 
management and internal controls.  
 
The ACs had resources in the form of financial and management support at their 
disposal to effectively carry out their activities. Adequate financial and management 
support enables the AC to effectively fulfil its oversight responsibilities.  
 
It was noted that some of the ACs did not participate in the process of appointing the 
head of the internal audit function, including setting the competency, qualification and 
remuneration criteria for the head of the internal audit function, as this process was 
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handled by the management of the SOE. ACs would be more effective if they were 
responsible for the appointment, performance assessment and dismissal of the head of 
the internal audit function, including a co-sourced or outsourced internal audit function.  
 
The ACs approved the charters of the internal audit function and reviewed and 
approved the internal audit plans, including the yearly budget, prior to the 
commencement of activities by the internal auditors. The ACs that reviewed internal 
audit reports placed reliance on the work of this function in assessing the quality of the 
SOEs’ internal controls. There were, however, some ACs which did not receive any 
internal audit reports. It is suggested that reviewing the work of the internal audit 
function would inform the AC whether material risks had been identified and were being 
appropriately mitigated. It would also strengthen the internal audit function, which is an 
important resource in fulfilling the AC’s responsibilities. There were some ACs that have 
met in private with internal auditors to discuss matters that should be discussed 
confidentially. 
 
Some ACs ensure that the SOE’s financial performance was a standing issue at each 
AC meeting. This made provision for the CFO to make presentations to the AC about 
the finances, budgets and budgetary reviews, financial overview and financial position 
and investments of the SOE at each quarterly AC meeting. Some ACs also reviewed 
the accounting policies affecting the SOE and recommended them to the board for 
approval. However, some ACs relied solely on what was presented by the SOE’s 
management and had no specific expectations of the management, which can be 
construed as a sign of inefficiency. For ACs to be effective, they would be expected to 
have a strong influence on the SOEs’ approach to financial reporting as opposed to 
simply relying only on what was presented by management. 
 
The ACs in this study recommended the appointment of external auditors for approval, 
which is a positive sign. Others, however, had little say as to who should be included in 
the audit team or the remuneration of the external auditors. This could be explained by 
the finding that some ACs did not include financial experts. Some ACs reviewed the 
work plan of the external auditors before the external auditors commenced work, which 
placed the ACs in a better position to recommend the annual financial statements for 
approval by the board. Some ACs met in private with the external auditors to discuss 
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matters that should be discussed confidentially. This allows the AC the freedom to have 
frank discussions with external auditors without management being present.  
 
Some ACs require that the compliance report from the legal department or company 
secretary be included in the agenda of every AC meeting, which ensures the AC is 
informed about any monitoring or enforcement actions against the SOE. Some ACs, 
however, relied on the SOEs’ management being truthful in disclosing the compliance of 
the SOE to legal and regulatory requirements in their reports. The AC would be better 
advised to satisfy itself that the SOE had an effective system of monitoring compliance 
and when matters for compliance are among the agenda points to be discussed at 
every AC meeting. 
 
The study revealed that ACs considered the SOEs’ risk management as a standing item 
on the agenda of some of the AC meetings while some ACs reviewed the risk logs of 
their SOE. This consideration of risk management by the ACs gives the ACs an 
understanding and level of comfort as to the SOEs’ process of identifying, managing 
and reporting on risk. It also gives the ACs an opportunity to discuss with management 
the policies and procedures addressing the risks identified. 
 
The ACs held a minimum of four meetings a year, which is the recommended number of 
meetings for an effective AC. In addition, some ACs held ad hoc meetings as 
necessary. ACs enjoyed support from management to schedule meetings, draft 
agendas and prepare AC packs through either the company secretary or legal 
department of the SOE. This administrative assistance from the management of the 
SOE enabled the AC to effectively carry out its duties.   
 
The findings suggested that some of the AC members, including the AC chairpersons, 
had little or no involvement in setting the agenda for the meetings which means that 
some important issues could be bypassed. It was revealed that some ACs operated 
without an annual work plan and relied on management to take the lead in setting the 
agendas and discussions of the AC meetings. The study suggests that ACs operate 
most effectively if they follow an annual work plan that addresses all AC responsibilities. 
 
There were no specific induction programmes tailor-made for AC members. Moreover, 
some ACs did not drive the process to train and develop members to carry out their 
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duties effectively. The findings suggest that the ACs instead relied on management to 
identify and propose training for the ACs. The study suggests that to be effective, ACs 
should prepare orientation programmes for both old and new AC members which are 
comprehensive, formal, tailor-made and well-suited to the environment and industry in 
which the SOE operates. In addition, AC members’ technical knowledge should be 
further developed through ongoing training which may include regular seminars and 
refresher courses. 
 
Some of the ACs had adopted the principles of King III and the NamCode in guiding 
their operations and when reporting on AC activities. This demonstrates the 
commitment of these ACs to enhancing the SOE’s corporate governance. 
 
5.3.4 Performance assessment of the audit committee  
 
The findings revealed that the ACs did not have specific performance assessments in 
place for the ACs, either collectively or individually. In addition, the ACs did not have 
specific measures to take action against non-performing AC members. This could 
weaken the AC’s ability to establish whether it was meeting its oversight responsibilities. 
The study findings suggest that regular and timely appraisal of the AC chairperson and 
individual members would improve the performance of the AC. This would also provide 
the basis for future training needs or for explaining why a re-appointment may or may 
not be appropriate. If ACs put in place measures to take action against non-performing 
members, it will encourage active participation of members in the activities of the AC. 
 
5.3.5 Reporting of the audit committee 
 
The findings revealed that the activities of some of the ACs had been adequately 
reported in the annual report of their SOE. This included a comprehensive AC report 
outlining the names of the AC members, a summary of main activities during the year 
including involvement in the appointment of the external auditors and ensuring the 
external auditors’ independence. The report also included the meetings held during the 
financial year and attendance of these meetings by each member of the AC. However, it 
was also noted that some of the ACs only included brief statements without disclosing 
the names of the members or activities undertaken during the specific financial year. 
The study suggests that the minimum information that should be reported by the ACs 
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should include the names and qualifications of all AC members, a statement on whether 
the AC had adopted a formal charter, a statement on whether the AC had considered 
the internal audit charter and the number of AC meetings held during the year. In 
addition, the study suggests that the AC report should also describe how the AC carried 
out its duties in accordance with the charter and give information on the independence 
of the AC. 
 
5.4 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 
No matter how well structured, every study has limitations which may affect its 
outcomes (Magidi, 2014). Therefore the limitations of this study are noted even though it 
was conducted with due consideration of the research design which was well-suited to 
achieving the objective of the study. 
 
The study sought to identify the factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in three 
Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. Therefore the ACs of other 
SOEs in Namibia were not investigated. Non-probability sampling was used to identify 
participants who would be most likely to yield rich data. Selection was thus based on the 
researcher’s judgement. The participants selected for this study did not represent a 
sample of a particular population. The experiences and views of the participants may 
therefore not represent the views and experiences of all those who participate in AC 
activities in SOEs in Namibia. 
 
The findings of this study are a reflection of the real experiences shared by participants 
in relation to the ACs in selected SOEs in Namibia and cannot be taken to prove or 
disprove any perception. This is because qualitative studies occur within the natural 
settings of the phenomenon under investigation, making it difficult to replicate the study 
and findings.     
 
It was difficult to address the experiences that emanated from this study with 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the ACs. Such a task would require 
collective action from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Enterprises and 
various other ministries under which specific SOEs fall, the SOEs’ boards of directors 
and management. The researcher has nonetheless made recommendations towards 
enhancing the effectiveness of the ACs of Namibian SOEs. 
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5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
In light of the findings of this study and its limitations, the researcher proposes several 
recommendations for future research. This study revealed that ACs of selected SOEs 
enjoyed resources, both in the form of monetary and management support, without 
establishing the adequacy of the resources provided to the ACs. Future research could 
explore the adequacy of resources provided to ACs at SOEs in Namibia. 
 
To be a member of an AC calls for great commitment (BRC, 1999). This study did not 
focus in depth on the commitment of the individual AC members in carrying out their 
tasks. Therefore, a future study could be done on the commitment of AC members in 
fulfilling their responsibilities as AC members at SOEs in Namibia. 
 
There were contrasting views expressed by the participants on the risk management 
activities at the SOEs. Some of the risk management activities were performed by the 
internal audit functions while some SOEs had designated risk management units to 
carry out the risk management activities. There is therefore a need for a future study to 
explore the risk management activities performed by an internal audit function versus 
the risk management activities performed by a designated risk management unit.   
 
Some of the participating SOEs outsourced their internal audit activities while others co-
sourced this function. This study did not establish the effectiveness of having an in-
house internal audit function compared to co-sourcing or outsourcing the internal audit 
functions in Namibian SOEs. Therefore, a future study could establish the impact on the 
effectiveness of ACs by having an in-house internal audit function compared to co-
sourcing or outsourcing the activities of an internal audit function in Namibian SOEs. 
 
This study revealed that the internal audit function has an important role to play in the 
performance of the ACs. However, the extent of the impact of the internal audit function 
on the performance of the ACs was not established. Hence, the need to explore the 
impact of the internal audit function on the performance of ACs at SOEs in Namibia. 
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5.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
  
This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on ACs. In particular, it 
contributes valuable insights on the factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in 
selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. This study is useful 
insofar as it informs Namibian SOEs of the important role played by ACs towards 
enhancing corporate governance. In particular, the outcomes of this study can be used 
to promote the effectiveness of ACs in the areas of operational mandate, composition, 
management of activities, performance assessments and reporting on activities. The 
study could encourage policy makers to enhance the effectiveness of ACs in Namibian 
SOEs by addressing deficiencies, specifically those linked to the operations of ACs in 
the current legislation governing SOEs or by establishing guidelines.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The study highlighted certain AC characteristics and practices contributing to the 
effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate 
governance. The mandate, composition, managing the activities of the AC, performance 
assessment of the members of the AC and reporting of the AC if applied correctly can 
enhance effectiveness of ACs. The study also highlighted weaknesses, suggesting that 
some of the ACs needed improvement in order to enhance corporate governance at 
SOEs. It is hoped that if this study’s recommendations are adopted, an improvement will 
be seen in the performance of SOEs and restoring public confidence. 
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Annexure A 
Sample letter to the Ministry of Public Enterprises 
 
Natanael Amoomo  
P.O. Box 22368 Windhoek Namibia, Mobile MD: +264813675435 
nathaoomo3@gmail.com 
 
Enquiries: N. Amoomo        Date 
   081 3675 435  
 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
 
Dear XXX 
 
PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH IN NAMIBIAN STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 
 
My name is Natanael Amoomo. I am a student at the University of South Africa in the 
College of Accounting Sciences, studying towards a Master’s of Philosophy Degree in 
Accounting Sciences. I intend to carry out a study entitled Strengthening Audit 
Committees in Namibian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
 
The purpose of the study is to understand how audit committees in Namibian SOEs are 
operating to improve corporate governance and add value to SOEs. This study has 
been approved by the ethics committee of the College of Accounting Sciences at the 
University of South Africa. 
 
The research will cover three SOEs, namely Namibia Water Corporation Limited, 
Agricultural Bank of Namibia and the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. A minimum of three 
participants will be selected for interviews per enterprise, namely, the chairperson of the 
audit committee or the vice chairperson, chief financial officer and the chief audit 
executive. The number of participants from each enterprise may be expanded if it 
becomes necessary to include more participants. 
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The results of the interviews will be kept strictly confidential. Participation in this 
research is completely voluntary and each participant may refuse to participate without 
consequence. Each participant will sign a letter of consent before the interviews and 
they will be informed that they can choose to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Participants are, however, encouraged not to withdraw because the results of the study 
are intended to promote good governance and adoption of best practice. The 
participants will not receive compensation for participating in the research.  
 
The information from individual interviews will be reported in aggregated form to protect 
the identity of participants. Neither I nor UNISA have a conflict of interest with the 
results. All findings will be presented in a confidential manner and no personal or 
identifiable information will be recorded or printed in the study, thus no names will be 
included in the dissertation.  All participants’ experiences and perceptions will be 
portrayed as they have stated in the interviews, no false information or accusations will 
be included in the final report.  
 
After examination of the dissertation, the findings will be presented to the board and 
audit committee in a formal report. This will enable the participating stakeholders to 
evaluate their AC’s performance against those of other SOEs. The results of this study 
could inform the debates by policy and decision makers on the important role that an 
effective AC can play in improving the quality of State-Owned Enterprises’ governance 
and accordingly performance.  
 
If you wish further information regarding this research or the rights of the research 
participants, you may contact my supervisor Prof EM Odendaal work tel: +27 12 4294 
363 and email: odendem@unisa.ac.za or my co supervisor: Prof B Ackers work tel: +27 
12 4298 993 and email: ackerb@unisa.ac.za . 
 
Thank you for your consideration. Your assistance in this regard is greatly appreciated.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
NATANAEL AMOOMO  
STUDENT NUMBER 34722068 
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Annexure B 
Sample letter to the State Owned Enterprises 
 
Natanael Amoomo  
P.O. Box 22368 Windhoek Namibia, Mobile MD: +264813675435 
nathaoomo3@gmail.com 
 
Enquiries:  N. Amoomo         
081 3675 435         Date 
 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
 
Dear XXX 
 
PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH AT XXX 
 
My name is Natanael Amoomo. I am a student at the University of South Africa in the 
College of Accounting Sciences, studying towards a Master’s of Philosophy Degree in 
Accounting Sciences. I intend to carry out a study titled Strengthening Audit Committees 
in Namibian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
 
The purpose of the study is to understand how audit committees at Namibian SOEs are 
operating to improve corporate governance and add value to SOEs. This study has 
been approved by the ethics committee of the College of Accounting Sciences of the 
University of South Africa. 
 
The research will cover a minimum of three participants namely the chairperson of the 
audit committee or the vice chairperson, chief financial officer and the chief audit 
executive. The number of participants from your enterprise may be expanded if it 
becomes necessary to include more participants. 
 
The results of the interviews will be kept strictly confidential. Participation in this 
research is completely voluntary and each participant may refuse to participate without 
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consequence. Each participant will sign a letter of consent before the interviews and 
they will be informed that they can choose to withdraw from the study at any time. 
Participants are, however, encouraged not to withdraw because the results of the study 
are intended to promote good governance and adoption of best practice. The 
participants will not receive compensation for participating in the research.  
 
Information obtained from the individual interviews will be reported in aggregated form 
to protect the identity of participants. Neither I nor UNISA have a conflict of interest with 
the results. All findings will be presented in a confidential manner and no personal or 
identifiable information will be recorded or printed in the study, thus no names will be 
included in the dissertation. All participants’ experiences and perceptions will be 
portrayed as they have stated in the interviews, no false information or accusations will 
be included in the final report.  
 
After examination of the dissertation, the findings will be presented to the board and 
audit committee in a formal report. This will enable the participating stakeholders to 
evaluate their AC’s performance against those of other SOEs. XXX will benefit from the 
results because they could inform debates by policy and decision makers on the 
important role that an effective audit committee can play in improving the quality of 
State-Owned Enterprises’ governance and accordingly performance.  
 
If you wish further information regarding this research or the rights of the research 
participants, you may contact my supervisor Prof EM Odendaal work tel: +27 12 4294 
363 and email: odendem@unisa.ac.za or my co supervisor: Prof B Ackers work tel: +27 
12 4298 993 and email: ackerb@unisa.ac.za . 
 
Thank you for your consideration. Your assistance in this regard is greatly appreciated.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
NATANAEL AMOOMO  
STUDENT NUMBER 34722068 
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Annexure C 
Documentation review 
 
Annual report 
 
Name of the SOE:  _________________________ 
Financial year end: _________________________ 
Physical address:  _________________________ 
    _________________________ 
    _________________________ 
Contact details: Tel: _________________________ 
  Fax:  _________________________ 
  Email: _________________________ 
 
Instructions 
 
Obtain a copy of the annual report and complete the questions below: 
 
1. What is the name of the chairperson of the board? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Is information about the audit committee disclosed? 
 
3. What are the names of the members of the audit committee and their positions? 
 
3.1 __________________________   Position  _________________________ 
3.2 __________________________  Position  _________________________ 
3.3 __________________________    Position  _________________________ 
3.4 __________________________    Position  _________________________ 
3.5 __________________________  Position  _________________________ 
3.6 __________________________  Position  _________________________ 
 
 
Yes No 
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4. What is the name of the audit committee member designated as a financial 
expert? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
5. How many of the members of the audit committee are designated as follows: 
 
5.1 Executive     ___________ 
5.2 Non-executive    ___________ 
5.3 Co-opted members    ___________ 
 
6. How many of the members of the audit committee have the following 
qualifications: 
 
6.1  Diploma     ____________ 
6.2  Bachelor degree    ____________ 
6.3  Master’s degree    ____________ 
6.4 Professional qualification   ____________ 
 
7. How many members of the audit committee have the following number of years’ 
experience as audit committee members: 
 
7.1 One year     ____________ 
7.2 Two years     ____________ 
7.3 More than two years   ____________ 
7.4 No previous experience   ____________ 
 
8. Does the audit committee have an approved audit committee 
charter? 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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9. What activities did the audit committee perform during the year? 
 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. How many audit committee meetings were held?   
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Annexure D 
Guiding questions - Chairperson of the audit committee 
 
1. About the chairperson 
 
1.1 Kindly share your experience in audit committees?  
 
2. Audit committee charter 
 
2.1 Is there a formal charter (terms of reference) in place for the audit committee? 
Provide a copy. 
 
2.2 Who approved the audit committee charter (terms of reference)? 
 
2.3 How often is the audit committee charter (terms of reference) reviewed? 
 
2.4  In your opinion, does the audit committee charter adequately empowers the 
audit committee to carry out its duties and responsibilities? 
 
2.5 Does the audit committee have an annual work plan in place to guide it in 
carrying out its duties and responsibilities? Provide a copy. 
 
3. Nomination to serve on the committee 
 
3.1 Explain how the audit committee members are nominated to serve on the audit 
committee and are there specific criteria for the appointment of audit committee 
members in place? 
 
3.2 Explain how the chairperson of the audit committee is appointed. 
 
4. Audit committee composition 
 
4.1 How many people are serving on the audit committee? 
 
4.2 In your opinion, is the size of the audit committee adequate? 
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4.3 Explain how the audit committee manages potential threats to audit committee 
members’ independence. 
 
5. Skills and experience 
 
5.1 How many audit committee members previously served on audit committees of 
other companies? 
 
5.2 Does the audit committee have a member designated as a financial expert? 
 
5.3 Can the audit committee source expert advice outside the audit committee? 
 
5.4 How many audit committee members have experience in finance and auditing? 
 
5.5 Explain the process and approach taken by the audit committee to carry out 
reviews with regard to the company’s internal control and financial reporting 
procedures. 
 
5.5.1 How are the recommendations of the audit committee handled? 
 
5.6 Explain the approach taken by the audit committee to review the financial 
statements of the company. 
 
5.7 What is the involvement of the audit committee in accounting policy decision 
making? 
 
5.8 What procedures does the audit committee perform with regard to the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function? 
   
5.9 What is the role of the audit committee in the appointment of the external 
auditors? 
 
5.10 What is the involvement of the audit committee in the scope and staffing as well 
as the work plan of the external auditors? 
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5.11 What is the approach of the audit committee to the independence and objectivity 
of the external auditors? 
 
5.12 How often does the audit committee meet in private with external auditors? 
 
5.13 How is the audit committee involved in the remuneration of the external auditors? 
 
5.14 Kindly discuss the approach the audit committee has on risk management.  
 
6. Managing the activities of the audit committee 
 
6.1 How does the audit committee manage in having audit committee meetings 
scheduled, agendas formulated and minutes drafted?  
 
6.1.1 Describe the process followed in preparing the agenda for an audit committee 
meeting. 
 
6.2 How often does the audit committee meet per financial year? 
 
6.3 Besides the audit committee members, who else attends the meetings of the 
audit committee? 
 
6.4 Does the audit committee receive relevant, reliable, sufficient and accurate 
information from management and the internal audit function for decision-making 
at audit committee meetings?  
 
6.4.1 Is there a prescribed format, type, extent and due date for the required 
information? 
 
6.4.2 How often is the information required by the audit committee requested from 
management and the internal and external auditors? 
 
6.5 How would you describe the relationship between the audit committee and 
management and the internal and external auditors and how can it be improved? 
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7. Training and development 
 
7.1 What arrangements are in place to give the audit committee members induction 
at the beginning of their term? 
 
7.2 What are the plans for training or ongoing training for the audit committee 
members? 
 
8. Performance assessment 
 
8.1  Explain how the performance of the audit committee members is evaluated and 
what does performance evaluation entail? 
 
8.2 What steps are taken against non-performing audit committee members? 
 
9. Good governance 
 
9.1  What code of good governance guides the operation of your audit committee? 
 
9.2 In your opinion, should the audit committee of SOEs prescribe to the principles of 
the NamCode of corporate governance? 
 
9.3 In your opinion, how can government assist in strengthening the audit committee, 
thereby improving their performance? 
 
9.4 Is there a process in place to benchmark the activities of the audit committee 
against best practices such as in the private sector or elsewhere? 
 
9.5 In your opinion, is your audit committee adding value to the company and what 
can be done to improve the audit committee? 
 
9.6 Is the audit committee receiving sufficient support from the board? 
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Annexure E 
Guiding questions - Chief Financial Officer 
 
1. Explain the reporting relationship between the audit committee and the finance 
department? 
 
2. Kindly explain the involvement of the audit committee in the internal control of the 
organisation? 
 
3. What is the involvement of the audit committee in achieving the integrity of the 
company’s financial reporting? 
 
4. To what extent is the audit committee involved in the accounting policies adopted 
by the company? 
 
5. To what extent is the audit committee involved in the accounting processes 
producing financial reports? 
 
6. How often does the audit committee review the company’s compliance with legal 
and regulatory requirements and adherence to corporate ethical standards? 
 
7. To what extent is the finance department involved in assisting the audit 
committee to carry out its activities? 
 
8. What contribution does the finance department make as far as training and 
development of audit committee members are concerned? 
 
9. What are the audit committee’s expectations from you (the Chief Finance Officer/ 
Finance Manager) with regard to the meetings of the audit committee?  
 
10. What is your opinion regarding audit committee members’ understanding of 
International Financial Reporting Standards? 
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11. Is the budget sufficient for the audit committee to carry out its activities?   
 
12. What is your opinion regarding the audit committee’s understanding of the role of 
the audit committee?  
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Annexure F 
Guiding questions - Chief Audit Executive  
 
1. Kindly explain the reporting structure of the internal audit function in the 
organisation. 
 
2. Explain the role of the audit committee in the structure and staffing, budget and 
other resources of the internal audit function. 
 
3. Explain the role of the audit committee in the appointment, remuneration and 
setting of the required qualifications of the head of the internal audit function. 
 
4. Explain the role of the audit committee in the charter, internal audit plans and 
other activities of the internal audit function. 
 
5. To what extent is the audit committee involved in determining whether the 
internal audit function complies with the internal audit standards? 
 
6. Explain to what extent the internal audit function is involved in assisting the audit 
committee to carry out its activities. 
 
7. Explain what contribution does the internal audit function make as far as training 
and development of members of the audit committee are concerned. 
 
8. What are the audit committee’s expectations from you (the Chief Audit 
Executive/Head of Internal Auditor/Internal Audit Manager) with regard to the 
meetings of the audit committees? 
 
9. How often do you (the Chief Audit Executive/Head of Internal Auditor/Internal 
Audit Manager) meet with the audit committee? 
 
9.1 What is the purpose of such meetings? 
 
10.  How often do you (the Chief Audit Executive/Head of Internal Auditor/Internal 
Audit Manager) meet with the audit committee in private? 
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11. Explain the relationship between the internal audit function and the audit 
committee. 
 
12. Kindly share your opinion regarding the audit committee members’ 
understanding of the role and objective of the audit committee. 
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Annexure G 
Letter to participants  
 
STRENGTHENING AUDIT COMMITTEES IN NAMIBIAN STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 
 
Dear Participant 
 
My name is Natanael Amoomo. I am a student at the University of South Africa in the 
College of Accounting Science, studying towards a Masters of Philosophy Degree in 
Accounting Sciences. The focus of my study is to understand how audit committees at 
Namibian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are operating to improve corporate 
governance and add value to SOEs. 
 
REASON TO PARTICIPATE  
Your SOE has been selected to participate in the study. Approval was obtained from the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises and also from the chief executive officer. The chief 
executive officer was also required to assist in providing the contact details of the 
potential participants.  You have been specifically selected because of your involvement 
in the audit committee or because of the close relationship you have with the audit 
committee. The selected participants for interviews are: chairpersons of the audit 
committee, chief audit executives and chief financial officers.  
 
HOW THE PARTICIPANT WILL ASSIST WITH THE STUDY 
Your role as a participant is to participate in the interview / discussion. The interview will 
comprise of semi-structured questions which I will be asking you. The interview 
questions will focus on the following: 
• Membership of the audit committee 
• Qualifications and experience of the audit committee members  
• Activities of the audit committee 
• Meetings involving the audit committee 
• Training and development of the audit committee members 
• Evaluation of the audit committee and its members 
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The interviews will be recorded with a digital voice recorder to ensure that information is 
correctly recorded. However, this will be done with your consent.  The interview is 
expected to take 40 to 60 minutes.  
 
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY  
The aim of the study is to promote the important role that audit committees can play in 
adding value to SOEs and the economy of the country. Many studies were done on 
SOEs but none has focused on SOEs’ audit committees. 
 
PLACE OF INTERVIEWS 
Interviews will preferably take place at a place you are most comfortable with, preferably 
at your work place.   
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The study will not record your name and will not link the results of the interview to you or 
to your SOE. No names will be used during the transcribing process and the information 
collected will be properly stored and protected. 
 
COLLECTED DATA 
Information collected will be kept for a period of up to five years and then destroyed. 
 
ETHICS PERMISSION 
This study has received approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the 
College of Accounting Sciences, UNISA. Should you need more information you may 
contact my supervisors Prof EM Odendaal, e-mail: odendem@unisa.ac.za, Tel: +27 12 
429 4363 or Prof B Ackers, e-mail: ackerb@unisa.ac.za, Tel: +27 12 429 8993. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Natanael Amoomo 
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Annexure H 
Consent to participate in this study 
 
I…………………………………………………………….. (Name) hereby give Natanael 
Amoomo consent to use information obtained from the interview in his study as part of 
his Master’s degree. 
 
• I understand that the information I provide will be treated as confidential and that 
anonymity will be maintained. 
• I confirmed having participated under informed consent. 
• I confirm that I am aware that I may at any point during the interview cease to 
participate without being adversely affected. 
 
Participant signature  …………………………………….. 
 
Date     ………………………………. 
 
